Chhattisgarh High Court holds that entries in school registers unsupported by original documentary proof or corroboration cannot be solely relied upon to establish the age of a victim in POCSO prosecutions. This judgment follows and applies Supreme Court precedent, emphasizing rigorous evidentiary standards under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. Serves as binding law for all subordinate courts in Chhattisgarh, and persuasive for courts elsewhere.
Summary
| Category | Data |
|---|---|
| Case Name | CRA/330/2016 of Pankaj @ Chhotu Pathak Vs State Of Chhattisgarh |
| CNR | CGHC010202452016 |
| Date of Registration | 05-03-2016 |
| Decision Date | 03-11-2025 |
| Disposal Nature | ALLOWED |
| Judgment Author | HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE BIBHU DATTA GURU |
| Court | High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur |
| Precedent Value | Binding Authority (within Chhattisgarh); persuasive for other courts |
| Overrules / Affirms | Affirms and applies precedent of Supreme Court (Alamelu, Rishipal Singh Solanki, P. Yuvaprakash etc.) |
| Type of Law | Criminal Law; Evidence; POCSO |
| Questions of Law | Whether school register entry alone, without supporting documents or direct evidence, proves minority in POCSO cases? |
| Ratio Decidendi |
The Court held that entries in a school register, regarding date of birth, are not sufficient proof of the victim’s age unless supported by primary source documents or corroborating oral testimony from persons with direct knowledge of the date of birth. The evidentiary standard set by Section 35 of the Evidence Act applies. The prosecution bears the burden to prove minority beyond reasonable doubt, and mere register entries—without proof of their basis—cannot establish guilt under the POCSO Act. In absence of credible proof of minority, POCSO offences are not made out. The reasoning followed binding Supreme Court decisions, emphasizing strict adherence to evidentiary hierarchy for age determination. |
| Judgments Relied Upon |
|
| Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon by the Court | Supreme Court authorities on hierarchy and probative value of documentary evidence for age; Section 35 Evidence Act; requirements under Section 94 JJ Act; scope and application of POCSO provisions; principle of benefit of doubt in criminal trials. |
| Facts as Summarised by the Court |
FIR was lodged alleging that the appellant threatened and harassed the prosecutrix, a student in Class 10th, and made advances amounting to offences under IPC and POCSO Act. The prosecution’s evidence on age included school register entries, unsupported by primary documents or legal testimony confirming the basis of said entries. Most prosecution witnesses turned hostile or were found unreliable. No medical evidence (ossification) was produced. The trial court convicted the appellant; on appeal, the High Court found evidentiary insufficiency and acquitted. |
Practical Impact
| Category | Impact |
|---|---|
| Binding On | All subordinate courts in Chhattisgarh |
| Persuasive For | Other High Courts and the Supreme Court |
| Follows |
|
What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note
- Re-emphasises that an entry in a school register on its own—without supporting documents or direct corroborating testimony—is not sufficient to prove age in POCSO prosecutions.
- Clarifies prosecution’s obligation to produce primary documentary evidence (e.g., original birth certificate, matriculation certificate) or credible medical evidence, particularly when age is a critical fact.
- Applies the evidentiary standards laid down by the Supreme Court for age determination; school register or transfer certificate needs a clear foundational link to primary source evidence.
- Benefit of doubt doctrine applies strictly in borderline cases where age is not conclusively established.
- Lawyers should specifically inquire into the documents forming the basis for any age entry in educational records and challenge unsupported entries.
Summary of Legal Reasoning
- The Court began by identifying the central issue: whether the victim was a minor on the date of the incident, as required for conviction under the POCSO Act.
- Analyzed the testimony of the victim, her parents, and the school principal, noting an absence of documentary proof or supporting evidence for the date of birth entry in the school’s Dakhil Kharij Register.
- Extensively relied on Supreme Court decisions (Alamelu; Birad Mal Singhvi; Narbada Devi Gupta; Ravinder Singh Gorkhi; Rishipal Singh Solanki; P. Yuvaprakash) to establish that mere entry in a school register or transfer certificate is not sufficient proof of age unless the basis of entry is corroborated by primary evidence or the testimony of the person who provided the date.
- Cited the hierarchy and procedure for age determination under Section 94(2) JJ Act, as clarified by the Supreme Court, and stressed that medical tests are to be sought only in the absence of qualifying documents.
- Noted the conflicting and insufficient evidence regarding the victim’s age and the lack of ossification or other medical proof.
- Held that, as per the binding legal position, insufficient and uncorroborated evidence on age requires benefit of doubt and precludes conviction under the POCSO Act.
- Accordingly, acquitted the appellant and set aside his conviction under both POCSO and IPC sections due to lack of cogent evidence and inconsistencies.
Arguments by the Parties
Petitioner (Appellant)
- Argued false implication due to a personal dispute between appellant and the prosecutrix’s father.
- Asserted that most prosecution witnesses were interested and had turned hostile.
- Pointed out that the school principal (PW-5) admitted to recording date of birth without examining any supporting document.
- Claimed inconsistencies and the lack of clinching evidence, especially regarding the prosecutrix’s age.
- Sought acquittal as the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
Respondent (State)
- Contended that the victim’s and other witnesses’ statements were reliable and proved the guilt.
- Maintained that sufficient evidence existed for conviction under the charged offences.
- Opposed interference with the trial court’s judgment.
Factual Background
The case arose from an FIR alleging that the appellant harassed and threatened the prosecutrix—a Class 10th student—by making advances and entering her house, allegedly intending to marry her against her will. The prosecution invoked Sections 451 IPC and 12 of the POCSO Act. The trial resulted in conviction based on statements of the victim, her parents, and a school principal. However, on appeal, substantive evidence for the victim’s minority (age) required for the POCSO charge was found insufficient, as the documented age was only in a school register, unsupported by primary proof or corroborative testimony.
Statutory Analysis
- Focus on Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, which mandates that entries in public records must be properly proved by those with direct knowledge for substantive reliance on contents.
- Discussed Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, which prescribes a hierarchy of documents for age determination: first, school/matriculation certificate; second, birth certificate from municipal/other authority; third, medical opinion in absence of documents.
- Stated Supreme Court’s view that ossification/medical tests alone cannot be the basis where documentary evidence is possible.
- No expansive or narrowed reading down; strict, precedent-based evidentiary approach reaffirmed.
Dissenting / Concurring Opinion Summary
No concurring or dissenting opinions are detailed in the judgment.
Procedural Innovations
No procedural innovations or new procedural guidelines were issued in this judgment.
Alert Indicators
- ✔ Precedent Followed – The Court strictly follows and applies established Supreme Court precedent on the evidentiary standard for proof of age in POCSO prosecutions.