The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh confirms that Annual Performance Appraisal Reports (APARs) vitiated by personal bias, violation of minimum supervision requirements, lack of reasoned orders, and delayed or mechanical disposal of representations are liable to be quashed. The judgment strictly enforces departmental guidelines and Supreme Court precedent, providing binding authority for service matters involving adverse confidential reports in Central Armed Police Forces and analogous government entities.
Summary
| Category | Data |
|---|---|
| Case Name | WP(C)/1607/2023 of VIKAS CHOUDHARY Vs UNION OF INDIA TH ITS SECRETARY MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS NEW DELHI AND OTHERS |
| CNR | JKHC020032952023 |
| Date of Registration | 14-06-2023 |
| Decision Date | 29-10-2025 |
| Disposal Nature | Disposed Off |
| Judgment Author | HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M A CHOWDHARY |
| Court | High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh |
| Bench | Single Bench (Justice M A Chowdhary) |
| Precedent Value | Binding within J&K and Ladakh High Court jurisdiction; persuasive elsewhere |
| Overrules / Affirms |
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| Type of Law | Service law / Administrative law (APAR/confidential reports) |
| Questions of Law |
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| Ratio Decidendi |
The court held that adverse APARs can be interfered with in writ jurisdiction where there is proof of personal bias, mala fide, or violations of mandatory departmental orders—such as the requirement that reporting/accepting authority must have supervised the officer for at least 90 days, or the obligation to provide reasoned, timely disposal of representations. In this case, the recording and acceptance of APARs by officers who had not met the minimum supervision period, along with non-speaking and delayed rejection of representations, rendered the process void and arbitrary. The court also found that proven personal animosity (supported by later departmental inquiry into the reporting officer) vitiates the fairness of the report and justifies quashing it. Judicial review remains limited to examining legality and process, not acting as an appellate forum on assessment merits. |
| Judgments Relied Upon |
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| Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon by the Court |
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| Facts as Summarised by the Court |
Petitioner, a CRPF officer, was aggrieved by adverse and below-benchmark APARs for 2018-19 and part of 2020 attributed to personal animosity from superiors against whom he had complained of malpractice. Subsequent representations against adverse APARs were rejected mechanically and belatedly, despite the officer’s otherwise outstanding record and later departmental actions validating his complaints. |
Practical Impact
| Category | Impact |
|---|---|
| Binding On | All subordinate courts and tribunals within the jurisdiction of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court |
| Persuasive For | High Courts in other states and the Supreme Court in similar service law matters |
| Follows |
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What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note
- Reaffirms that APAR/adverse remarks are vitiated if reporting or accepting officers have not observed the subordinate for at least 90 days as per Standing Orders.
- Strictly enforces the requirement that reviewing and accepting authorities must provide reasons and not merely echo “I agree” or “I disagree”.
- Mechanical and delayed rejections of representations against APARs violate principles of natural justice and are liable to be set aside.
- Establishes that proven personal bias/mala fides—especially where supported by subsequent departmental inquiry—is a valid ground for quashing adverse APARs.
- The limited scope of judicial review in confidential report matters does not prevent interference where illegality, arbitrariness, or breach of statutory rules is demonstrated.
- Mandates review DPC and retroactive promotion if illegality in adverse grading is established.
Summary of Legal Reasoning
- The court first addressed maintainability, holding that it was not necessary for the petitioner to separately challenge interim or consequential administrative orders, provided the basic grievance was before the court, as per P. Chitharanja Menon v. Balakrishnan and Roshan Lal v. International Airport Authority.
- Relying on State Bank of India v. Kashinath Kher and Delhi High Court’s Shri Tersem Kumar v. Union of India, the court emphasized the critical importance of confidential reports/APARs for career advancement, noting that arbitrary or procedurally defective reports risk derailing legitimate promotion prospects.
- By referencing Swapan Kumar Pal v. Achintya Kumar Nayak, the court reaffirmed that judicial review is limited to process and legality, not to reviewing the merits of performance assessment, unless there is a legal or procedural defect.
- The court found manifest violations of Standing Order No.04/2015:
- The accepting officer had not satisfied the 90-day supervision rule, so his acceptance of the APAR lacked jurisdiction, a defect going to the root.
- Both the reviewing and accepting authorities used boilerplate “I agree” language without divulging reasons, breaching clause 3.19, which necessitates a speaking order and application of mind for upgrades/downgrades.
- The representation against the adverse APAR was rejected after an inordinate delay of over 13 months, with no engagement with the substantive grounds, contrary to Standing Order requirements and principles of natural justice.
- The court accepted the petitioner’s evidence and the respondents’ unrefuted acknowledgment that the reporting officer was eventually subjected to a departmental inquiry for malpractices, corroborating allegations of malice and personal vendetta.
- The court concluded that the adverse remarks were the product of bias and mala fides and that mandatory procedural guidelines were breached, rendering the APAR process illegal and arbitrary.
- Consequently, the court directed expunction of the adverse remarks, a review DPC, and the grant of notional promotion if the petitioner was otherwise eligible.
Arguments by the Parties
Petitioner
- APAR for 2018-19 was accepted by an officer who did not supervise for the mandatory 90 days; hence, it is invalid.
- Bias and personal vendetta from reporting/reviewing officers led to downgrading.
- Department recognized and corrected similar bias in subsequent years but not for 2018-19.
- All advisory/warning memos were part of a ploy; representations against them remain undecided.
- Received commendations and awards during the same period, contradicting adverse APAR.
- Delay and mechanical rejection of representations further vitiates the adverse APAR.
- Cited procedural violations of Standing Orders and lack of application of mind.
Respondents
- Relief concerning 2020 APAR already granted via competent authority.
- DG CRPF’s Order dated 29.08.2023 not challenged; thus, petition not maintainable for that period.
- Court cannot act as appellate authority over APARs or decide disputed factual issues.
- Writ of certiorari cannot be issued under Article 226(3) of Constitution in such matters.
Factual Background
The petitioner, a CRPF officer, was aggrieved by adverse and below-benchmark grading in his APAR for the year 2018-19 and part of 2020, allegedly due to personal bias and hostility from his superiors, whom he had accused of corrupt practices. He filed representations against the adverse APARs, which were mechanically and belatedly rejected by higher authorities. While the department subsequently corrected part of the adverse APAR (2020) after court intervention, it maintained the adverse 2018-19 grading. The petitioner’s broader complaint—including the impact on his promotion, flagrant breach of procedural safeguards, and malice—remained unredressed, prompting the writ petition.
Statutory Analysis
- Standing Order No.04 of 2015 (CRPF): Sets minimum 90-day active supervision period for any officer (reporting/reviewing/accepting) to be eligible to record/accept APARs; requires reasoned orders if agreeing/disagreeing with lower officers’ assessments (clause 3.19); prescribes that representations against adverse reports must be decided within 30 days with objective reasoning.
- Constitution of India, Article 226: Scope of writ jurisdiction clarified—courts may interfere with administrative/processual illegality but not to act as appellate body on merits.
- No reading down or expansive reinterpretation of other statutes was undertaken.
Dissenting / Concurring Opinion Summary
No dissenting or separate concurring opinions were recorded in this judgment.
Procedural Innovations
- The judgment reiterated that legal challenges to the parent (original) administrative order suffice; consequential or interim orders need not be separately impugned if the root grievance survives.
- Reaffirmed necessity for reasoned (speaking) orders even in administrative contexts, tying departmental Standing Orders directly to judicial review.
- Mandated review DPCs as intrinsic remedial mechanism where APARs have been wrongly downgraded.
Alert Indicators
- ✔ Precedent Followed – The court closely follows and applies established Supreme Court model on judicial review of confidential (APAR) reports and administrative law in service matters, reinforcing existing law.