Summary
| Category | Data |
|---|---|
| Court | Supreme Court of India |
| Case Number | C.A. No.-000574-000575 – 2026 |
| Diary Number | 55611/2024 |
| Judge Name | HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA |
| Bench | HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA and HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAY BISHNOI |
| Precedent Value | Binding |
| Overrules / Affirms |
|
| Type of Law | Arbitration law (Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996) |
| Questions of Law | Whether applications under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for extending an arbitral tribunal’s mandate lie before the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (or a High Court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction) as defined in Section 2(1)(e), regardless of appointment under Section 11? |
| Ratio Decidendi | The Court held that the term “Court” in Section 29A must bear the meaning assigned in Section 2(1)(e) unless the context otherwise requires. No contextual indication exists to override that definition. Appointment powers under Section 11 are limited to constituting the tribunal and exhausted thereafter. Consequently, applications for extension or substitution under Section 29A lie before the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or a High Court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction and not before the appointing High Court or the Supreme Court under Section 11. Section 42 does not alter this result. |
| Judgments Relied Upon |
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| Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon by the Court |
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| Facts as Summarised by the Court | A family‐settlement clause led to arbitration; after the presiding arbitrator resigned, the High Court appointed a replacement under Section 11. The Commercial Court had earlier granted an extension of time for the award under Section 29A(4). A writ petition challenged that extension on jurisdictional grounds. Conflicting High Court precedents prompted this reference, and the Supreme Court restored the Commercial Court’s power to entertain extension applications under Section 29A. |
Practical Impact
| Category | Impact |
|---|---|
| Binding On | All Principal Civil Courts of original jurisdiction and High Courts exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction in domestic arbitration matters under Section 29A |
| Persuasive For | Other High Courts (when faced with conflicting precedents) |
| Overrules | High Court decisions that disapplied Section 2(1)(e) in the context of Section 29A (e.g., Cabra Instalaciones, Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel streams) |
| Distinguishes | Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC&C & C JV (where original appointment was not by the Court) |
| Follows |
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What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note
- Clarifies that applications under Section 29A(4) must be filed before the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (or a High Court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction) as defined in Section 2(1)(e), irrespective of whether the tribunal was appointed by that High Court under Section 11.
- Reinforces that statutory definitions prevail unless the provision’s context explicitly requires departure; no such context exists in Section 29A.
- Reaffirms that Section 11 appointment power is exhausted once the tribunal is constituted; no supervisory power remains with the appointing Court.
- Rejects arguments based on “hierarchy,” “jurisdictional anomaly,” or “conflict of powers” as impermissible substitutes for statutory text.
- Confirms that Section 42’s exclusive‐jurisdiction rule does not apply to appointments under Section 11, leaving Section 29A governed solely by Section 2(1)(e).
Summary of Legal Reasoning
- Reframing the Issue
The Court distilled the question to whether an application to extend the arbitral mandate under Section 29A(4) lies before a Section 11 appointing Court or the “Court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e). - Divergent High Court Approaches
Two streams:- Strict application of Section 2(1)(e) to Section 29A.
- Contextual disapplication to avoid “conflict” when Section 11 appointment exists.
- Role and Limits of Section 11
Citing SBP & Co., appointment by a Chief Justice or designate is a limited, one‐time function; the appointing Court becomes functus officio thereafter. - Text and Context of Section 29A
Located in Chapters V & VI (conduct/termination); establishes time limits, extension and substitution powers vested in the “Court” defined by Section 2(1)(e). - Statutory Definition Imperative
Under Associated Contractors and Nimet Resources, defined terms control unless context demands otherwise—no context in Section 29A permits departure. - Inapplicability of Section 42
Reinforced by State of Jharkhand, Section 42 does not transform appointing Courts under Section 11 into courts of original jurisdiction for extension applications. - Conclusion
Extension and substitution under Section 29A rest with Civil Courts as defined; High Court jurisdiction under Section 11 does not override this scheme.
Arguments by the Parties
Petitioner
- Section 29A read with Section 2(1)(e) confines extension applications to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (or a High Court in original civil jurisdiction), regardless of Section 11 appointment.
Respondent
- Appointment of the arbitrator by the High Court under Section 11(6) transfers exclusive jurisdiction for extension under Section 29A to that High Court; Civil Courts cannot entertain such applications once a tribunal is appointed by the High Court.
Factual Background
Parties to a family‐settlement agreement invoked arbitration. After the presiding arbitrator resigned, an application under Section 11 resulted in the High Court appointing a replacement. Meanwhile, the Commercial Court granted an extension under Section 29A(4). A writ petition challenged the Commercial Court’s jurisdiction, prompting divergent High Court rulings on the scope of “Court” in Section 29A and referral to this Court.
Statutory Analysis
- Section 29A (Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996) sets a 12-month timeline for awards, allows party-consented six-month extension, and terminates the mandate if uncompleted—subject to extension by the “Court” under sub-sections (4), (6), and (7).
- Section 2(1)(e) defines “Court” for domestic arbitration as the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, including a High Court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, excluding inferior courts and Courts of Small Causes.
- Section 42 provides that once an application under Part I is made in a Court, that Court alone has jurisdiction over all subsequent applications. The Supreme Court confirmed that Section 42 does not apply to Section 11 appointments, so it does not alter the rule in Section 29A governed by Section 2(1)(e).
Alert Indicators
- 🚨 Breaking Precedent – Overrules High Court decisions disapplying Section 2(1)(e) in Section 29A context
- ✔ Precedent Followed – SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd.; Associated Contractors; Nimet Resources Inc.; State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.
- 🔄 Conflicting Decisions – Resolves divergent High Court rulings on jurisdiction under Section 29A