Summary
| Category | Data |
|---|---|
| Court | Supreme Court of India |
| Case Number | C.A. No.-006075-006075 – 2016 |
| Diary Number | 32381/2012 |
| Judge Name | HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR |
| Bench |
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASANNA B. VARALE |
| Precedent Value | Binding on all subordinate courts and High Courts in property/injunction disputes |
| Overrules / Affirms |
Affirms High Court; sets aside trial and first-appellate decrees; upholds Anathula Sudhakar; distinguishes Sant Lal Jain & Joseph Severance |
| Type of Law | Civil procedure; Specific Relief Act (property injunction) |
| Questions of Law |
|
| Ratio Decidendi | The Court held that Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act forbids granting a mandatory injunction simpliciter where title and possession are under serious dispute and a suit for possession (with injunction) is available. Licence-case precedents (Sant Lal Jain; Joseph Severance) apply only where possession is permissive and title undisputed. In property disputes with contested title and identity of land, the remedy of a full suit for declaration/possession must be pursued. The High Court’s exercise of Section 100 CPC jurisdiction was justified because the trial and first-appellate courts erred in law and lacked proof of the wall’s precise location. |
| Judgments Relied Upon |
|
| Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon |
|
| Facts as Summarised by the Court |
|
Practical Impact
| Category | Impact |
|---|---|
| Binding On | All subordinate courts and High Courts in India handling property-injunction suits |
| Persuasive For | Courts considering the scope of Section 41(h) SRA and second-appeal interference in concurrent findings |
| Overrules | Trial Court decree dated 22.03.2001 and First Appellate Court decree dated 30.01.2004 |
| Distinguishes | Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh (1985) 2 SCC 332; Joseph Severance & Ors v. Benny Mathew & Ors (2005) 7 SCC 667 |
| Follows | Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (2008) 4 SCC 594 |
What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note
- Clarifies that where title and possession are in serious dispute, a suit for mandatory injunction alone is barred under Section 41(h) SRA; a suit for possession (with injunction) is required.
- Confirms that licence-case precedents (Sant Lal Jain, Joseph Severance) apply only to permissive possession with undisputed title.
- Affirms that Section 100 CPC empowers second appeals to correct perverse concurrent findings of fact and law.
- Emphasises the need for precise evidence of the location and dimensions of structures sought to be removed.
Summary of Legal Reasoning
- Section 41(h) SRA prescribes refusal of injunction if an “equally efficacious” remedy exists.
- In permissive-possession cases (licences), mandatory injunction may suffice (Sant Lal Jain; Joseph Severance).
- Where title and possession are contested and the property identity is unclear, a full suit for declaration/possession (with injunction) is the proper remedy (Anathula Sudhakar).
- Trial and first-appellate courts erred by granting an injunction-only decree without resolving title uncertainty or proving wall location.
- High Court’s Section 100 CPC interference was justified due to misapplication of law and absence of foundational evidence.
Arguments by the Parties
Petitioners (Plaintiffs-Appellants)
- Trial and first-appellate courts correctly found title and possession; High Court misapplied Section 100 CPC by re-appreciating facts.
- Section 41(h) inapplicable because plaintiffs were already in possession; no prayer for possession needed (rely on Sant Lal Jain, Joseph Severance).
- Impugned order vitiated by jurisdictional and legal errors.
Respondent (Defendant-Respondent)
- Suit barred under Section 41(h) SRA: removal of a wall is dispossession; remedy of possession is equally efficacious.
- Plaintiffs failed to identify the exact 15 biswa or wall location; injunction decree unsustainable.
- High Court decided pure questions of law in second appeal; no re-appreciation of evidence.
Factual Background
In 1992, plaintiff-partners bought 15 biswa in Khasra No. 436 by registered sale deed and mutated revenue records. The defendant built a boundary wall along the pucca road abutting the land, obstructing plaintiffs’ access. Plaintiffs sued for a mandatory injunction to remove the wall; trial and first-appellate courts granted relief. The High Court, in second appeal, set aside those decrees on grounds of statutory bar under Section 41(h) SRA, clouded title and possession, and lack of proof of wall’s precise location.
Statutory Analysis
- Section 41(h), Specific Relief Act, 1963: injunction refused if “equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding.”
- Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: second appeal jurisdiction limited to substantial questions of law arising from perverse or legally unsustainable concurrent findings.
Alert Indicators
- ✔ Precedent Followed – Upholds Anathula Sudhakar’s framework
- 🔄 Conflicting Decisions – Reverses trial and first-appellate courts’ decrees under Section 100 CPC