Summary
| Category | Data |
|---|---|
| Court | Supreme Court of India |
| Case Number | SPL.REF. No.-000001 – 2025 |
| Diary Number | 39157/2025 |
| Judge Name | HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE |
| Bench | Constitution Bench (HON’BLE CJI, B.R. Gavai, Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Atul S. Chandurkar) |
| Concurring or Dissenting Judges | None |
| Precedent Value | Binding on all Indian courts |
| Overrules / Affirms |
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| Type of Law | Constitutional law – legislative procedure; Governor’s & President’s powers under Articles 200/201 |
| Questions of Law |
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| Ratio Decidendi | The Governor under Article 200 has three exclusive options—assent, withhold + return (if not a Money Bill) or reserve for President—and enjoys genuine discretion in choosing among them, free from Council of Ministers’ advice; these options are non-justiciable, no implicit timelines or deemed-assent can be read in, and only a limited mandamus against unexplained inaction is available. |
| Judgments Relied Upon |
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| Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon |
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| Facts as Summarised by the Court | The President referred 14 questions under Art. 143(1) on Governor’s and President’s powers under Arts. 200/201 after divergence in State of Tamil Nadu (2025); parties challenged maintainability and scope; Supreme Court answered functional queries on options, discretion, justiciability, timelines, deemed-assent and remedies for inaction. |
Practical Impact
| Category | Impact |
|---|---|
| Binding On | All subordinate courts and High Courts on interpretation of Articles 200 & 201 |
| Persuasive For | Legislators drafting state Bills; Union Parliament in presidential references |
| Overrules | State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) on timelines and justiciability |
| Distinguishes | Two-judge bench decisions prescribing timelines or limited discretion |
| Follows | Kameshwar Singh; Valluri Basavaiah; Hoechst Pharmaceuticals; Samsher Singh; Purushothaman Nambudiri; Nabam Rebia; Rameshwar Prasad; Aeltemesh Rein |
What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note
- Governor under Art. 200 has exactly three options—assent, reserve, or withhold + return (if not Money Bill)—not four.
- Governor’s choice is a true discretion, not bound by Council of Ministers’ aid & advice.
- Functions under Arts. 200/201 are non-justiciable; Courts cannot review merits of assent, reservation or return.
- No implied time-limits or deemed-assent can be read into Arts. 200/201.
- Limited judicial review is available only to compel the Governor to act within a reasonable time against unexplained or indefinite inaction.
- Art. 361 immunity of Governor does not bar a mandamus to address inaction; it only bars personal liability for official acts.
Summary of Legal Reasoning
- Textual Analysis: Art. 200’s substantive text offers three “either/or” options; the first proviso qualifies “withhold” (return with message) and the second proviso qualifies “assent” (reserve if it derogates High Court powers).
- Historical Context: Draft debates, colonial precedents and textual choices confirm that the provisos restrict rather than expand options.
- Constitutional Principles: A dialogic process between Governor, Legislature and President embodies checks-and-balances within cooperative federalism.
- Discretion & Aid & Advice: Absent explicit confinement by Art. 163(1), discretion persists in line with Samsher Singh, M.P. Establishment, Nabam Rebia.
- Justiciability & Remedies: Merits-review of Governor’s or President’s choice is barred; Courts may only issue a limited mandamus against unexplained or indefinite inaction.
- Timelines & Deemed Assent: No timelines or ‘deemed assent’ can be implied in Arts. 200/201; Articles 109–110(4–5) and 198(4–5) illustrate when deeming is constitutionally permitted.
- Immunity: Art. 361 shields Governor from personal answerability but does not prevent judicial scrutiny of inaction or ultra vires acts.
Arguments by the Parties
President/Union (Supporting Reference)
- Art. 200 grants three clear options; Governor must have genuine discretion.
- Discretion arises from text, structure and practice of Constitution.
- No timelines or ‘deemed assent’ in Arts. 200/201; Courts cannot supervise legislative process.
- President need not seek Art. 143 opinion every time; subjective satisfaction is sufficient.
Opposing Parties (States & Intervenors)
- Governor is part of elected executive and bound by Council’s aid & advice (Art. 163).
- Inaction threatens rule of law; judicially prescribed timelines needed.
- Deemed assent and judicial substitution necessary to prevent indefinite pendency.
- Decision of Governor/President must be subject to review for mala fides or unreasonableness.
Factual Background
On 13 May 2025, the President under Art. 143(1) referred 14 questions about the Governor’s and President’s powers under Articles 200/201 to the Supreme Court, reflecting doubts after a two-judge bench decision in State of Tamil Nadu (2025). Parties challenged maintainability and scope of the advisory reference. A Constitution Bench addressed options, discretion, justiciability, timelines, deemed assent and remedies for gubernatorial inaction.
Statutory Analysis
- Article 200: Three options on presentation of a Bill: assent; withhold + return (if not Money Bill); reserve for President; provisos qualify withhold and assent.
- Article 201: Three options on Bills reserved for President: assent; withhold; return with message to Legislature (with six-month reconsideration).
- Article 163: Governor acts on Council’s advice “except” where Constitution requires discretion.
- Article 361: Immunity of President/Governor from personal answerability for official acts.
- Other relevant provisions: Arts. 168, 175, 198–199, 213, 254(2), 288(2), 360, 376 on legislative process and federal checks.
Procedural Innovations
- Recognition of a limited mandamus remedy to compel the Governor to act under Art. 200 within a reasonable time, without merits-review or judicial substitution.
Alert Indicators
- 🚨 Breaking Precedent – Overrules State of Tamil Nadu (2025) on timelines and justiciability
- ✔ Precedent Followed – Affirms Kameshwar Singh, Valluri, Hoechst, Samsher Singh, Nambudiri, Rameshwar Prasad
- 🔄 Conflicting Decisions – Resolves split between smaller-bench decisions prescribing timelines and discretion limits