Summary
| Category | Data |
|---|---|
| Court | Supreme Court of India |
| Case Number | W.P.(C) No.-000914-000914 – 2025 |
| Diary Number | 53500/2025 |
| Judge Name | HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR |
| Bench |
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| Precedent Value | Upholds existing precedent on Section 51(3) as an independent and continuing power |
| Overrules / Affirms | Affirms State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik (1982 3 SCC 519) |
| Type of Law | Constitutional law – judicial administration and writ jurisdiction |
| Questions of Law |
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| Ratio Decidendi | The Court held that Section 51(3) confers an independent, non obstante power on a High Court Chief Justice—subject only to the Governor’s approval—to appoint “other place[s]” of sitting for the convenient transaction of business. This power is distinct from Section 51(2), does not effect territorial bifurcation, and may be exercised repeatedly. Mandatory Full Court consultation is not prescribed. Judicial review is limited to jurisdictional excess, mala fides or manifest unreasonableness. |
| Judgments Relied Upon |
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| Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon by the Court |
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| Facts as Summarised by the Court |
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Practical Impact
| Category | Impact |
|---|---|
| Binding On | All High Courts and subordinate courts |
| Persuasive For | Other High Courts considering additional sittings under Section 51(3) |
| Follows | State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik (1982 3 SCC 519) |
What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note
- Clarifies that Section 51(3)’s non obstante clause confers an independent, continuing power on the Chief Justice to appoint additional sittings, regardless of duration.
- Affirms that appointments under Section 51(3) do not effect territorial bifurcation or convert into permanent Benches under Section 51(2).
- Confirms the Governor’s approval is the sole statutory requirement; Full Court deliberation is a matter of practice, not law.
- Reiterates that judicial review is confined to jurisdictional excess, mala fides or manifest unreasonableness—courts will not substitute their policy choices.
- Holds that Article 14 does not mandate identical treatment of all regional demands; a rational link to access to justice suffices.
- Endorses decentralisation under Article 21 as advancing physical accessibility to High Court sittings.
Summary of Legal Reasoning
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Statutory Scheme
- Section 51(1): President may fix principal seat.
- Section 51(2): President (after consultation) may establish permanent Benches with exclusive territorial jurisdiction.
- Section 51(3) (non obstante): Chief Justice, with Governor’s approval, may appoint “other place[s]” of sitting for convenience.
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Puranik Precedent
- Power under Section 51(3) is independent, continuing, and not exhausted by past exercises.
- Appointments under Section 51(3) do not create territorial bifurcation or exclusive jurisdiction.
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Constitutional Role of Chief Justice
- Administrative authority vested in Chief Justice as head of High Court.
- Consultation beyond Governor’s approval is not statutorily mandated.
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Limits of Judicial Review
- Review confined to ultra vires, mala fides or manifest unreasonableness.
- No interference in bona fide administrative arrangements within statutory bounds.
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Article 14 & 21 Analysis
- Rational basis standard: clustering contiguous districts around Kolhapur meets access-to-justice objective.
- Decentralisation of High Court sittings furthers physical accessibility under Article 21.
Arguments by the Parties
Petitioner
- Section 51(3) was intended for temporary or exceptional exigencies, not permanent sittings.
- Lack of Full Court discussion breaches institutional consultation norms.
- Past committee rejections estop current exercise; abrupt reversal is arbitrary.
- Selection of Kolhapur to the exclusion of Pune, Solapur is discriminatory (Article 14).
- Diverting judicial resources undermines district courts and access to justice (Article 21).
Respondents (State of Maharashtra & High Court Administration)
- Section 51(3) is an independent and continuing statutory power, as upheld in Puranik.
- Chief Justice’s administrative role includes organising sittings; Governor’s approval suffices.
- Absence of Full Court deliberation is not a legal flaw.
- Past administrative decisions do not create estoppel; decisions adapt to changed circumstances.
- Rational basis for choosing Kolhapur exists; decentralisation improves access.
Factual Background
The petitioner under Article 32 challenged Notification No. P.0108/2025 (01.08.2025) issued by the Bombay High Court under Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, designating Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting, approved by the Governor and operational from 18 August 2025. Historically, the Bombay High Court sat at Bombay with permanent Benches at Nagpur, Aurangabad and Panaji; demands from Kolhapur region prompted the administrative decision. The petitioner alleged misuse of Section 51(3), lack of consultation, arbitrariness under Articles 14 and 21, and sought quashing of the notification.
Statutory Analysis
- Section 51(1): Principal seat of a new State’s High Court fixed by President.
- Section 51(2): President, after consultation with Governor and Chief Justice, may establish permanent Benches with defined territorial jurisdiction.
- Section 51(3) (non obstante): Chief Justice, with Governor’s approval, may appoint other places to sit for the more convenient transaction of judicial business.
- General Clauses Act, 1897, Section 14: Statutory powers may be exercised from time to time unless expressly limited.
Alert Indicators
- ✔ Precedent Followed