Summary
| Category | Data |
|---|---|
| Court | Supreme Court of India |
| Case Number | C.A. No.-012232-012232 – 2025 |
| Diary Number | 50891/2023 |
| Judge Name | HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAM NATH |
| Bench |
|
| Concurring or Dissenting Judges | All three judges concurred |
| Precedent Value | Binding |
| Overrules / Affirms | Affirms |
| Type of Law | Professional-misconduct / disciplinary procedure under Advocates Act, 1961 |
| Questions of Law |
|
| Ratio Decidendi |
|
| Judgments Relied Upon | Nandlal Khodidas Barot v. Bar Council of Gujarat, 1980 Supp SCC 318 |
| Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon |
|
| Facts as Summarised by the Court |
|
Practical Impact
| Category | Impact |
|---|---|
| Binding On | All State Bar Councils and their Disciplinary Committees |
| Persuasive For | High Courts considering challenges to reference orders under Section 35 |
| Distinguishes | Cases treating mere identification of a party or attestation of documents as professional misconduct |
| Follows | Nandlal Khodidas Barot v. Bar Council of Gujarat, 1980 Supp SCC 318 |
What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note
- Section 35 requires recording of prima facie reasons before a Bar Council can refer any advocate to a Disciplinary Committee.
- A jural (client-advocate) relationship is a precondition for invoking disciplinary jurisdiction.
- Mere identification of a party in consent terms or attestation of affidavit does not amount to professional misconduct.
- Cryptic or laconic reference orders devoid of any discussion of the complaint’s allegations will be quashed.
- Supreme Court invoked Article 136 to quash proceedings where statutory safeguards were ignored.
Summary of Legal Reasoning
- Article 136 jurisdiction was rightly invoked to quash proceedings that flouted statutory mandate and threatened an advocate’s professional reputation.
- The respondent-advocate in both matters had no professional relationship with the complainant and did not represent the opposite party in any way amounting to misconduct.
- Section 35(1) requires the State Bar Council to record reasons to believe that misconduct has occurred before referring a complaint to its Disciplinary Committee.
- Reliance on Nandlal Khodidas Barot confirmed that a prima facie satisfaction—grounded in a discussion of allegations—is a sine qua non.
- Mere identification of a litigant in consent terms or of an affidavit deponent in a chamber summons is a court-room formality, not a professional breach.
- Absence of any “minimum discussion” of the complaint rendered the reference order invalid.
Arguments by the Parties
Petitioner (Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa)
- Challenge was premature; no need for detailed reasons at the cognizance stage.
- Reference orders under Section 35 are amenable to challenge only before the Bar Council of India.
- High Court committed jurisdictional error by entertaining an interlocutory writ petition.
Respondent-Advocate (Rajiv Narula / Geeta Shastri)
- Complaints were mala fide and malicious; no professional or jural relationship existed.
- No recall or rescission of the consent terms or affidavit, so allegations lacked foundation.
- The reference orders were cryptic, without any discussion of specific allegations, violating Section 35.
Factual Background
In 2022, Khimji Parmar filed a disciplinary complaint under Section 35 against advocate Rajiv Narula, alleging concealment and fraud in consent terms of a suit over a leased property; the Bar Council referred the complaint on a cryptic order. Separately, Bansidhar Bhakad lodged a complaint against advocate Geeta Shastri for identifying an affidavit deponent in a chamber summons. The Bombay High Court stayed both proceedings. On appeal by the Bar Council, the Supreme Court quashed both references for failure to record reasons and absence of any jural relationship.
Statutory Analysis
- Section 35(1) mandates that upon receipt of a complaint, the State Bar Council must record reasons to believe the advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct before referral.
- Section 35(3) prescribes that the Disciplinary Committee may dismiss, reprimand, suspend, or remove the advocate only after formal inquiry.
- The judgment underscores that statutory safeguards—reasoned satisfaction and client-advocate nexus—cannot be bypassed by laconic orders.
Dissenting / Concurring Opinion Summary
All three judges authored a unanimous judgment; there were neither dissenting nor separate concurring opinions.
Procedural Innovations
None introduced; the Court applied established Article 136 jurisdiction and reaffirmed statutory requirements under Section 35.
Alert Indicators
- ✔ Precedent Followed