Does Section 35 of the Advocates Act Mandate a Prima Facie Rationale and Jural Relationship Before Referring Misconduct Complaints to a Disciplinary Committee?

 

Summary

Category Data
Court Supreme Court of India
Case Number C.A. No.-012232-012232 – 2025
Diary Number 50891/2023
Judge Name HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAM NATH
Bench
  • HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAM NATH
  • HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP MEHTA
  • HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. ANJARIA
Concurring or Dissenting Judges All three judges concurred
Precedent Value Binding
Overrules / Affirms Affirms
Type of Law Professional-misconduct / disciplinary procedure under Advocates Act, 1961
Questions of Law
  • Whether Section 35 requires recording of prima facie reasons before referring a complaint to the Disciplinary Committee?
  • Is a jural (client-advocate) relationship a precondition for invoking disciplinary jurisdiction?
  • Can mere identification of a party or attestation of an affidavit constitute “professional misconduct”?
Ratio Decidendi
  1. Section 35(1) of the Advocates Act mandates that a State Bar Council, before referring a complaint to its disciplinary committee, must record “reasons to believe” that the advocate has been guilty of misconduct.
  2. A prima facie satisfaction must rest on at least a bare discussion of the complaint’s allegations.
  3. Existence of a jural relationship between complainant and advocate is a precondition for disciplinary jurisdiction; absent such relationship, reference is impermissible.
  4. Mere identification of a party in consent terms or attestation of an affidavit does not, without more, amount to professional misconduct.
  5. A cryptic, laconic reference order deprived the advocate of statutory protection and was therefore quashed under Article 136.
Judgments Relied Upon Nandlal Khodidas Barot v. Bar Council of Gujarat, 1980 Supp SCC 318
Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon
  • Statutory interpretation of Section 35 scheme and mandatory “reasons to believe.”
  • Role of State Bar Council as “sentinel” of professional conduct.
  • Article 136 jurisdiction to quash disciplinary proceedings in extreme cases.
  • Distinction between genuine misconduct and routine court-room formalities.
Facts as Summarised by the Court
  • Complainant alleged that advocate Rajiv Narula concealed material facts and procured consent decree in a land-dispute suit without representing or obtaining instructions from certain parties.
  • Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa passed a cryptic order referring the complaint to its Disciplinary Committee under Section 35.
  • Advocate Rajiv Narula had only identified the plaintiff in consent terms; he never represented the complainant or related parties.
  • In a connected petition, a complaint was filed against advocate Geeta Shastri for merely identifying a deponent in an affidavit.
  • High Court stayed both references; this Court granted SLPs and quashed both proceedings for lack of reasons and jural nexus.

Practical Impact

Category Impact
Binding On All State Bar Councils and their Disciplinary Committees
Persuasive For High Courts considering challenges to reference orders under Section 35
Distinguishes Cases treating mere identification of a party or attestation of documents as professional misconduct
Follows Nandlal Khodidas Barot v. Bar Council of Gujarat, 1980 Supp SCC 318

What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note

  • Section 35 requires recording of prima facie reasons before a Bar Council can refer any advocate to a Disciplinary Committee.
  • A jural (client-advocate) relationship is a precondition for invoking disciplinary jurisdiction.
  • Mere identification of a party in consent terms or attestation of affidavit does not amount to professional misconduct.
  • Cryptic or laconic reference orders devoid of any discussion of the complaint’s allegations will be quashed.
  • Supreme Court invoked Article 136 to quash proceedings where statutory safeguards were ignored.

Summary of Legal Reasoning

  1. Article 136 jurisdiction was rightly invoked to quash proceedings that flouted statutory mandate and threatened an advocate’s professional reputation.
  2. The respondent-advocate in both matters had no professional relationship with the complainant and did not represent the opposite party in any way amounting to misconduct.
  3. Section 35(1) requires the State Bar Council to record reasons to believe that misconduct has occurred before referring a complaint to its Disciplinary Committee.
  4. Reliance on Nandlal Khodidas Barot confirmed that a prima facie satisfaction—grounded in a discussion of allegations—is a sine qua non.
  5. Mere identification of a litigant in consent terms or of an affidavit deponent in a chamber summons is a court-room formality, not a professional breach.
  6. Absence of any “minimum discussion” of the complaint rendered the reference order invalid.

Arguments by the Parties

Petitioner (Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa)

  • Challenge was premature; no need for detailed reasons at the cognizance stage.
  • Reference orders under Section 35 are amenable to challenge only before the Bar Council of India.
  • High Court committed jurisdictional error by entertaining an interlocutory writ petition.

Respondent-Advocate (Rajiv Narula / Geeta Shastri)

  • Complaints were mala fide and malicious; no professional or jural relationship existed.
  • No recall or rescission of the consent terms or affidavit, so allegations lacked foundation.
  • The reference orders were cryptic, without any discussion of specific allegations, violating Section 35.

Factual Background

In 2022, Khimji Parmar filed a disciplinary complaint under Section 35 against advocate Rajiv Narula, alleging concealment and fraud in consent terms of a suit over a leased property; the Bar Council referred the complaint on a cryptic order. Separately, Bansidhar Bhakad lodged a complaint against advocate Geeta Shastri for identifying an affidavit deponent in a chamber summons. The Bombay High Court stayed both proceedings. On appeal by the Bar Council, the Supreme Court quashed both references for failure to record reasons and absence of any jural relationship.

Statutory Analysis

  • Section 35(1) mandates that upon receipt of a complaint, the State Bar Council must record reasons to believe the advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct before referral.
  • Section 35(3) prescribes that the Disciplinary Committee may dismiss, reprimand, suspend, or remove the advocate only after formal inquiry.
  • The judgment underscores that statutory safeguards—reasoned satisfaction and client-advocate nexus—cannot be bypassed by laconic orders.

Dissenting / Concurring Opinion Summary

All three judges authored a unanimous judgment; there were neither dissenting nor separate concurring opinions.

Procedural Innovations

None introduced; the Court applied established Article 136 jurisdiction and reaffirmed statutory requirements under Section 35.

Alert Indicators

  • ✔ Precedent Followed

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