The High Court has reaffirmed that writ jurisdiction should not ordinarily be exercised where an efficacious statutory appellate remedy exists; petitions challenging contract cancellation, forfeiture, and blacklisting must first be addressed before the designated appellate authority under the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. This judgment upholds existing precedent on alternate remedies for challenges in the public works/construction contracts sector and serves as binding authority for subordinate courts in the State.
Summary
| Category | Data |
|---|---|
| Case Name | WPC/5447/2025 of M/S SANJAY SINGHI Vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH |
| CNR | CGHC010435122025 |
| Date of Registration | 14-10-2025 |
| Decision Date | 15-10-2025 |
| Disposal Nature | DISPOSED OFF |
| Judgment Author | Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice |
| Concurring or Dissenting Judges | Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge |
| Court | High Court Of Chhattisgarh |
| Bench | Division Bench: Hon’ble The Chief Justice and Hon’ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru |
| Precedent Value | Binding within jurisdiction; persuasive for other courts |
| Overrules / Affirms | Affirms existing law on alternate statutory remedies |
| Type of Law | Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Municipal Contracts |
| Questions of Law | Whether a writ petition is maintainable to challenge cancellation of work order, forfeiture of deposit, and blacklisting by a municipal corporation when a statutory appellate remedy under Section 403 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 remains available and is already under invocation. |
| Ratio Decidendi | The Court held that where the impugned order is already under challenge before the competent appellate authority under Section 403 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, and the remedy is available to the petitioner, writ jurisdiction should not ordinarily be exercised. The petitioner must first exhaust the alternate statutory remedy; hence, the writ petition was dismissed as premature. |
| Facts as Summarised by the Court | Petitioner’s contract for city road construction was cancelled by the Municipal Corporation; earnest money and security deposits were forfeited, and the petitioner was blacklisted for three years. The petitioner alleged arbitrariness, violation of natural justice, and mala fides. Respondent highlighted existence and invocation of a pending statutory appeal. |
Practical Impact
| Category | Impact |
|---|---|
| Binding On | All subordinate courts and authorities within the jurisdiction of Chhattisgarh High Court |
| Persuasive For | Other High Courts; can be cited as reflective of the principle on alternate remedies in contract disputes involving state entities |
| Follows | Principle that writ jurisdiction is not ordinarily exercised where effective alternate statutory remedy exists; aligns with established Supreme Court doctrine |
What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note
- Reaffirms that the presence and invocation of an efficacious statutory appellate remedy bars maintainability of writ petitions, even in cases involving cancellation, forfeiture, and blacklisting by government authorities.
- Clarifies that where a statutory appeal is already filed and pending, the writ court will decline to intervene at the preliminary stage.
- Highlights the need for contractors and practitioners to seek redress before the designated appellate forum under the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 before approaching the writ court.
Summary of Legal Reasoning
- The Court examined the submissions and found that the petitioner had already initiated an appellate challenge under Section 403 of the Municipal Corporation Act.
- Emphasized that the statutory remedy of appeal was efficacious and available to the petitioner.
- Based on the settled principle that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised when an effective alternate remedy exists (unless exceptional circumstances are demonstrated), the Court deemed the writ petition premature.
- The Court declined to consider merit-based grievances, granting liberty to the petitioner to pursue statutory remedies.
Arguments by the Parties
Petitioner:
- The cancellation of the contract, forfeiture of earnest money and security deposit, and blacklisting are arbitrary, mala fide, and violate Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
- Petitioner completed substantial work and was prevented from finishing due to unseasonal rains, a factor outside their control, and communicated this to the authorities.
- No fair or proper opportunity of hearing was granted prior to punitive actions.
- The same authority (Commissioner) acting as original and appellate authority is vitiated by bias, contrary to principles of natural justice.
Respondent:
- The impugned order is already challenged by the petitioner before the competent appellate authority under Section 403 of the Municipal Corporation Act.
- The petitioner’s statutory remedy is available and pending consideration.
- The writ petition is premature, as the petitioner cannot bypass the alternative statutory remedy.
Factual Background
The petitioner, a registered civil contractor, was awarded a work order in March 2025 for construction of a bituminous road in Rajnandgaon city. The petitioner mobilized resources and commenced work, but alleged that completion was hampered due to unseasonal rains and non-provision of design details by municipal authorities. The contract was cancelled, earnest money and security deposit forfeited, and the petitioner was blacklisted for three years. The petitioner claimed arbitrariness and violation of natural justice. Respondents pointed out that a statutory appeal was already pending under Section 403 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956.
Statutory Analysis
- Section 403 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 was noted as providing a statutory appellate remedy against orders of municipal authorities.
- The Court relied on this provision to determine the existence of an efficacious alternate remedy, precluding writ jurisdiction.
Alert Indicators
- ✔ Precedent Followed – Reaffirms the established principle that writ jurisdiction will not be invoked where an efficacious alternative statutory remedy exists and is already availed.