Can sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act be confined to post-limitation delay?

 

Summary

Category Data
Court Supreme Court of India
Case Number C.A. No.-011794-011794 – 2025
Diary Number 19303/2017
Judge Name HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA
Bench

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE R. MAHADEVAN

Precedent Value Binding authority
Overrules / Affirms Overrules Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 361) to the extent it confined “within such period” to only post-limitation days
Type of Law Civil procedure / Limitation Act
Questions of Law
  • What is the meaning and import of “within such period” in Section 5?
  • When may appellate courts interfere with discretion to condone delay?
  • Was the High Court justified in condoning a 3,966-day delay?
Ratio Decidendi Section 5’s phrase “within such period” refers both to the original statutory limitation window and the days beyond it up to filing. “Sufficient cause” must be shown to explain delay across the entire continuum, not only after expiry. The provision grants discretion to extend—but not exclude—time for bona fide delays; courts must assess negligence or indolence and may refuse to condone delay even if cause is shown.
Judgments Relied Upon
  • Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 361)
  • State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani ((1996) 3 SCC 132)
  • Ajit Singh Thakur v. State of Gujarat ((1981) 1 SCC 495)
  • State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612)
  • Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari (1968 SCC OnLine SC 139)
  • Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer ((2013) 14 SCC 81)
  • Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. ((2012) 3 SCC 563)
  • Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India ((2023) 10 SCC 531)
Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon
  • Plain-text and contextual import of “within such period” with “after the prescribed period” and “for not preferring”
  • Maxims ‘interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium’ and ‘vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt’
  • Distinction from Section 14’s “good faith,” yet elasticity of “sufficient cause”
  • Public policy against routine tardiness by State bodies in pursuit of justice
Facts as Summarised by the Court Parcels of land in dispute; compromise decree in partition suit awarded title but State’s housing board remained in possession. Suit for possession dismissed, first appeal succeeded in 2006. No steps taken till execution notice in 2011. Second appeal filed in 2017 with 3,966-day delay, High Court condoned delay under Section 5 Limitation Act.

Practical Impact

Category Impact
Binding On All subordinate courts
Persuasive For High Courts, Company Law Board, Tribunals
Overrules Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 361)
Distinguishes Ajit Singh Thakur v. State of Gujarat ((1981) 1 SCC 495)
Follows State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612)

What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note

  • “Within such period” under Section 5 includes both the statutory limitation span and any days beyond up to actual filing.
  • Delay must be explained across the entire period from accrual to filing, not merely post-expiry.
  • “Sufficient cause” requires bona fide reasons, absence of negligence or lethargy, and is not a carte blanche for State or private litigants.
  • Courts retain discretion even after sufficient cause is shown—may refuse condonation if inaction is imputable.
  • Subsequent delays from bureaucratic inertia no longer justify routine condonation post-Postmaster General (2012 3 SCC 563).

Summary of Legal Reasoning

  1. Textual analysis: Section 5 speaks of appeals “after the prescribed period” if sufficient cause for not filing “within such period” is shown.
  2. “Within such period” ties to both “for not preferring” (the original limitation window) and “after the prescribed period” (delay up to filing).
  3. Rewa Coal Fields (1962 SC 361) confined “within such period” to post-expiry days—overruled.
  4. Courts must consider inaction, negligence, lack of bona fides across entire limitation span when assessing sufficiency of cause.
  5. Section 5’s marginal note speaks of “extension” of time, not “exclusion,” reinforcing entire-period scrutiny.
  6. State or public authority is bound by the same standard as private parties; bureaucratic inertia no longer automatically condones delay.
  7. Appellate courts may intervene only if lower courts abused discretion, ignored material evidence, or erred in law—should defer to plausible exercises of discretion.

Arguments by the Parties

Petitioner

  • No “sufficient cause” shown for 3,966-day delay.
  • Gross negligence of housing board staff is imputable; remedy forfeited by inaction.
  • Matter must be finally dismissed on limitation principle, not merits.

Respondent

  • Delay caused by bureaucratic file-pushing, multiple departmental clearances, and inadvertent inaction.
  • Substantial justice demands hearing merits; technicality should not bar relief.
  • Prompt internal disciplinary action against responsible officers demonstrates bona fide.

Factual Background

  1. Title-holder obtained land by partition decree including 4 acres “donated” to State housing board.
  2. Suit for declaration and possession dismissed in 1997; first appeal succeeded in 2006, awarding compensation.
  3. No execution steps taken till 2011 notice; possession unaltered.
  4. Housing board filed second appeal only in 2017, 3,966 days late, seeking condonation under Section 5 Limitation Act.
  5. High Court condoned delay, prompting appeal on the interpretation of “within such period.”

Statutory Analysis

  • Section 5 Limitation Act: permits admitting late appeals/applications if “sufficient cause” shown for not filing “within such period.”
  • “Prescribed period” = timetable under Schedule I for appeals/applications.
  • Explanation must cover the entire timeframe from accrual to actual filing, not only post-expiry days.
  • Discretionary power: even if cause established, court may refuse condonation.
  • Explanation by high courts must consider inaction, negligence, and bona fides; public policy demands finality and vigilance.

Alert Indicators

  • 🚨 Breaking Precedent – Overrules Rewa Coal Fields (AIR 1962 SC 361)
  • 🔄 Conflicting Decisions – Resolves post-Rewa split on “within such period” interpretation

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