Can Parliament Re-enact Invalidated Tribunal Reform Provisions Without Curing Constitutional Defects?

Summary

Practical Impact

What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note

• Parliament cannot nullify binding Supreme Court directions by reenacting invalidated provisions without removing their constitutional defects.
• Age-based bars (50 years minimum) and truncated tenures (four years) for tribunal members are arbitrary and violate judicial independence and equality under Article 14.
• Search-cum-Selection Committees must recommend only one name per vacancy; any two-name panel requirement is unconstitutional.
• Allowance and service conditions pegged strictly to civil-service grades infringe judicial autonomy; court-mandated enhanced HRA or housing must prevail.
• Judicial review extends to structural principles (separation of powers, basic structure), not just to explicit constitutional text; policy prerogative does not immunize constitutionally deficient rules.
• Individual appointments made post-enactment but based on pre-existing selections remain protected.

Summary of Legal Reasoning

1. Constitutional Supremacy & Judicial Review

   • The Constitution is supreme; judicial decisions under Article 141 bind all organs, including Parliament.
   • Parliament may cure defects identified by the Court but cannot perpetuate provisions already struck down.

2. Doctrine of Separation of Powers & Judicial Independence

   • Tribunals exercise judicial functions; their structure, tenure, and conditions must mirror essential attributes of courts.
   • Executive or legislative control over appointments, tenure, and allowances undermines independence.

3. Invalid Legislative Override

   • The 2021 Act repeats invalid provisions (minimum age, tenure caps, two-name panels, civil-service allowances) without curing defects.
   • Such mere reenactment is an impermissible override of binding judgments (MBA IV, MBA V, Rojer Mathew).

4. Article 14 & Equality of Opportunity

   • Arbitrary classification (age barrier) lacks rational nexus to tribunal performance and excludes meritorious younger advocates.
   • Equal protection demands open eligibility based on expertise and experience, not age.

5. Remedial Directions & Relief

   • Struck down offending Sections 3, 5, 7 and related provisions in multiple enactments.
   • Affirmed earlier directives: single-name recommendations, five-year terms, reappointment, adequate housing or HRA, and establishment of a National Tribunals Commission.

Arguments by the Parties

Petitioner (Madras Bar Association)

• Provisions (age, tenure, panel-size, allowances) violate separation of powers and judicial independence; basic structure infringement.
• Legislative override of Supreme Court directions is impermissible; rules frustrate vested rights and legitimate expectations of tribunal members.
• Arbitrary age and tenure caps deter qualified candidates; executive-dominated Selection Committee undermines judicial oversight.

Respondent (Union of India)

• Law-making is Parliament’s domain; courts cannot prescribe legislative form or content.
• Judicial directions are not binding legislation; they represent suggestions that do not limit legislative choice.
• Selection, conditions, and structures of tribunals fall within legitimate policy; no constitutional bar to age criteria or tenure limits unless violating explicit constitutional provisions.
• Supervisory role of courts must yield where statute validly redefines tribunal framework.

Factual Background

The Madras Bar Association challenged the constitutional validity of the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021, which codified provisions from a 2021 Ordinance and the Finance Act, 2017. Key contested measures included a minimum appointment age of 50, tenure limits of four years (with 70/67 retirement caps), requirement that Selection Committees forward two names per vacancy, and service conditions aligned to equivalent civil-service grades. Numerous specialized tribunals and appellate boards were abolished or their jurisdictions transferred. The petition asserted these measures violated separation of powers, judicial independence, and equality under Article 14.

Statutory Analysis

• Section 3: Non-obstante clause imposes 50-year minimum age for Chairperson/Members.
• Section 5: Four-year tenure or retirement at age 70/67, whichever earlier; purported to override binding judicial terms.
• Section 7: Salary/allowances fixed to civil-service equivalents; house rent linked to government rates.
• Mirror Amendments: Dozens of statutes (Customs Act, Copyright Act, CIN, SEBI Act, NGT Act, etc.) stripped tribunal structures and transferred functions to courts or Commercial Courts.
• Comparison: Provisions are verbatim reproductions of Ordinance 2021 and Finance Act, 2017 rules—no substantive cure of defects.

Procedural Innovations

• National Tribunals Commission within four months to oversee appointments, conditions, and infrastructure of all tribunals.
• Protection for pre-Act appointments: selections completed before enforcement but notified later continue under prior framework and retained full terms.
• Clarification that pending tribunal vacancies must be filled promptly in accordance with binding precedents.

Alert Indicators

• 🚨 Breaking Precedent – Legislatively re-enacted provisions struck down as unconstitutional
• ✔ Precedent Followed – Reaffirms a chain of tribunal-independence judgments from Sampath Kumar through MBA V