The Himachal Pradesh High Court clarified that, where the accused admits in a Section 313 CrPC statement that the complainant is a partner, failure to produce the partnership deed is not fatal to the maintainability of a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Court reaffirmed that a partner can represent the firm without written authorisation or production of a deed, following established precedent and principles under the Partnership Act. This ruling restores the appeal and remits the matter for trial on merits, and stands as binding authority in Himachal Pradesh.
Summary
| Category | Data |
|---|---|
| Case Name | CR.A/108/2014 of Ms GEE ESS TRADING CO. Vs PRABHA BHAGRA |
| CNR | HPHC010020312014 |
| Date of Registration | 10-04-2014 |
| Decision Date | 31-10-2025 |
| Disposal Nature | Allowed |
| Judgment Author | HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAKESH KAINTHLA |
| Court | High Court of Himachal Pradesh |
| Bench | Single Judge (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla) |
| Precedent Value | Binding within the jurisdiction of Himachal Pradesh High Court |
| Overrules / Affirms |
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| Type of Law |
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| Questions of Law |
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| Ratio Decidendi |
The High Court held that where the accused, in their Section 313 CrPC statement, admits the complainant is a partner of the firm, the complaint under Section 138 NI Act is maintainable even if the partnership deed is not produced. The Court emphasised that a partner, as per Section 18 of the Partnership Act, is an agent of the firm and can act on its behalf, including filing complaints. The Court further clarified that admissions recorded under Section 313 CrPC can be relied upon, following multiple Supreme Court decisions, to support material facts not disputed by the defence. The judgment set aside the trial court decision, holding that the requirement to produce the partnership deed and written authorisation was a technicality and remitted the matter for trial on merits. |
| Judgments Relied Upon |
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| Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon by the Court |
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| Facts as Summarised by the Court |
The complainant (Malkiat Singh), claiming to be a partner in M/s Gee Ess Trading Company, filed a Section 138 NI Act complaint against the accused for dishonour of cheque. The accused admitted during 313 CrPC statement that Malkiat Singh was a partner and purchased goods, but denied liability and claimed the cheque was given as security. The trial court acquitted for want of proof of partnership. On appeal, the complainant sought to produce the partnership deed as additional evidence, which was denied on grounds that evidence could have been led earlier. The High Court considered whether the complaint was maintainable even without production of the deed, particularly in the context of the accused’s admission. |
Practical Impact
| Category | Impact |
|---|---|
| Binding On | All subordinate courts within Himachal Pradesh |
| Persuasive For | Other High Courts in India (regarding the interplay of Section 313 CrPC admissions, partnership law, and NI Act complaints) |
| Distinguishes | Shirgul Filling Station v. Kamal Sharma, 2025:HHC:21725-DB (distinguished on facts—here, the accused’s admission under Section 313 was present; in Shirgul, it was not) |
| Follows |
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What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note
- The Court clarified that a Section 138 NI Act complaint is maintainable without production of a partnership deed if the accused admits the complainant’s partnership status in their Section 313 CrPC statement.
- The requirement to produce the partnership deed or written authorisation is a technicality if the relationship is admitted or otherwise not disputed by the accused.
- A partner is by default an agent for the firm under Section 18 of the Partnership Act and can initiate proceedings on its behalf.
- Section 313 CrPC statements, where relevant, may provide sufficient evidence of otherwise disputed facts, reducing the need for further documentary proof.
- Attempts to introduce new documents at appellate stage (Section 391 CrPC) will not succeed where the party already had fair opportunity at trial to do so.
- The Court remitted the case for fresh disposal on merits, without findings on other factual disputes.
Summary of Legal Reasoning
- Scope of Appellate Interference with Acquittals: The Court summarised Supreme Court precedent (Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand; Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka) that interference is warranted only if the acquittal is perverse, ignores material evidence, or no reasonable view other than conviction is possible.
- Additional Evidence under Section 391 CrPC: The Court relied on State of Rajasthan v. Asharam; Sukhjeet Singh v. State of U.P.; H.N. Jagadeesh v. R. Rajeshwari; Rajvinder Singh v. State of Haryana; Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat—to hold that additional evidence cannot be admitted at the appellate stage to fill lacunae where opportunity existed at trial.
- Section 313 CrPC Statement: The Court cited State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura, and others, holding that admissions in an accused’s Section 313 CrPC statement can be considered by the Court, and where the accused admits the key fact (here, partnership), that suffices.
- Partnership Law: Following Section 18, Partnership Act and Reshmi Constructions v. Laxman Vithal Chunekar (Bom HC), the Court held that partners are agents of the firm and need no written authority to file on behalf of the firm.
- Distinction from Previous Rulings: The Court distinguished previous High Court rulings (e.g., Shirgul Filling Station v. Kamal Sharma) on the specific absence of relevant admissions under Section 313 and clarified that requirements differ where admissions are present.
- Result: Held the complaint maintainable, set aside acquittal, and remitted the case.
Arguments by the Parties
Petitioner (Appellant/Complainant):
- Trial court erred in requiring proof of partnership deed when accused had admitted partnership in her Section 313 CrPC statement.
- Acquittal based on a mere technicality despite material admissions.
- Sought setting aside of acquittal and remitting matter for decision on merits.
Respondent (Accused):
- The trial court rightly required proof of the complainant’s status as payee or holder in due course.
- Complaint not maintainable without production of partnership deed or evidence of authorisation.
- Relied on Shirgul Filling Station v. Kamal Sharma, 2025:HHC:21725-DB, as supporting authority.
Factual Background
The complainant, Malkiat Singh, filed a complaint as an alleged partner of M/s Gee Ess Trading Company for dishonour of a cheque issued by the accused, who had purchased hardware items. The cheque was dishonoured for insufficient funds. During trial, the accused admitted in their Section 313 CrPC statement that Malkiat Singh was a partner and had supplied goods, but disputed liability, claiming blank cheques were given as security. The trial court acquitted the accused solely for want of proof that Malkiat Singh was a partner or duly authorised. On appeal, the complainant’s attempt to adduce the partnership deed as additional evidence was rejected by the High Court, which then considered the effect of the accused’s admission.
Statutory Analysis
- Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act: Relating to dishonour of cheque.
- Section 18, Partnership Act: Establishes that every partner is agent of the firm; thus can act on behalf of the partnership.
- Sections 313, 391 CrPC: Section 313—accused’s statement may be taken into account; Section 391—appellate court’s power to admit additional evidence, but restricted to prevent filling lacunae if party had fair opportunity at trial.
- The Court interpreted these provisions in light of their object and existing precedent, noting their proper interplay in the context of complaints by firms.
Dissenting / Concurring Opinion Summary
No dissenting or concurring opinions were delivered in this judgment.
Procedural Innovations
- Reiteration of Limits on Additional Evidence (Section 391 CrPC): The judgment expressly reiterated that the appellate court cannot entertain production of documents that were available and could have been produced at trial, thereby reinforcing prudent practice on what may be adduced as additional evidence on appeal.
Alert Indicators
- ✔ Precedent Followed – Existing law on Section 313 CrPC, agency of partners, and appellate procedure is reaffirmed.