Is a Suit for Mandatory Injunction Without Claiming Possession Barred Under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act When Title and Possession Are Disputed?

 

Summary

Category Data
Court Supreme Court of India
Case Number C.A. No.-006075-006075 – 2016
Diary Number 32381/2012
Judge Name HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR
Bench HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR; HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASANNA B. VARALE
Concurring or Dissenting Judges HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASANNA B. VARALE (concurring)
Precedent Value Binding authority
Overrules / Affirms Affirms Section 41(h) Specific Relief Act bar and principles in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy
Type of Law Civil law (property, injunction)
Questions of Law
  • Maintainability of injunction‐only suit under Section 41(h) SR Act when title/possession are disputed
  • Scope of second‐appeal jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC
Ratio Decidendi

Where title and possession of immovable property are both under serious dispute and the exact portion is not precisely identified, a suit for injunction simpliciter is barred by Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, and the plaintiff must sue for possession with consequential injunction relief.

The doctrine of “equally efficacious remedy” limits injunctive relief to cases where no alternative remedy exists. Precedents permitting injunction without possession (e.g., Sant Lal Jain; Joseph Severance) apply only to permissive‐possession scenarios and not to contested title/possession disputes.

The High Court’s exercise of second‐appeal jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC was proper, as substantial questions of law arose from the misapplication of settled principles and absence of foundational proof regarding the wall’s location.

Judgments Relied Upon
  • Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (2008)
  • Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh (1985)
  • Joseph Severance v. Benny Mathew (2005)
Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon
  • Doctrine of “equally efficacious remedy” under Section 41(h) SR Act
  • Section 100 CPC on substantial questions of law
  • Distinction between permissive and disputed possession
  • Requirement of precise identification/evidence for mandatory injunction
Facts as Summarised by the Court Plaintiffs bought 15 biswa in Khasra No. 436 via registered sale deed; defendant erected wall blocking plaintiffs’ access to a pucca road; title and possession were contested; trial and first appellate courts granted mandatory injunction; High Court allowed second appeal, held injunction-only suit barred, and dismissed the suit.

Practical Impact

Category Impact
Binding On All subordinate courts and High Courts when dealing with mandatory-injunction suits
Persuasive For Other benches of this Court on injunction-only claims
Distinguishes
  • Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh (1985)
  • Joseph Severance v. Benny Mathew (2005)
Follows Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (2008)

What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note

  • Confirms that Section 41(h) SR Act bars injunction-only suits where title and possession are both disputed and the plaintiff cannot precisely identify the obstructed portion.
  • Distinguishes precedents allowing injunction without possession (Sant Lal Jain; Joseph Severance) as limited to permissive or licensee occupancy.
  • Emphasises that a full suit for possession (with injunction as consequential relief) is required in contested-title scenarios.
  • Underlines the need for clear, foundational proof of the exact location and measurements of the obstruction before seeking mandatory injunction.
  • Affirms that High Courts in second appeal may correct concurrent findings when substantial questions of law arise from misapplication of statutory provisions.

Summary of Legal Reasoning

  1. Scope of Section 41(h) SR Act
    Injunction cannot issue if an “equally efficacious remedy” exists. In contested-title and contested-possession cases, suit for possession with consequential injunction is the proper remedy.
  2. Distinction from Permissive-Possession Precedents
    Sant Lal Jain and Joseph Severance involved licensee or permissive occupation with no title dispute; injunction alone was efficacious. Present case involves serious title/possession disputes and uncertain boundaries; those precedents do not apply.
  3. Requirement of Foundational Evidence
    No precise map, measurements, or reliable revenue report to show wall fell within plaintiffs’ purchased portion. Absence renders mandatory-injunction decree unsustainable.
  4. Second-Appeal Jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC
    High Court properly identified substantial questions of law—misapplication of Section 41(h) SR Act and failure to require possession claim. Interference with concurrent lower-court decrees was justified.

Arguments by the Parties

Petitioners (Plaintiffs/Appellants)

  • Trial and first appellate courts correctly found plaintiffs in title and possession; High Court erred by re-appreciating facts in second appeal.
  • Injunction-only suit maintainable where plaintiffs were already in possession; reliance on Sant Lal Jain and Joseph Severance.
  • Bar under Section 41(h) SR Act misapplied; no need to seek possession where possession is undisputed.

Respondent (Defendant)

  • Suit for removal of wall without claiming possession barred by Section 41(h) SR Act; High Court correctly applied statutory bar.
  • Cloud over title and possession necessitates a declaration/possession suit, not injunction simpliciter.
  • Lack of precise identification of wall’s location within purchased land defeats any injunction claim; reliance on Anathula Sudhakar.

Factual Background

Plaintiffs, partners in Vaishali Builders, purchased 15 biswa of land in Khasra No. 436 by registered sale deed dated 06.01.1992 and secured mutation in revenue records. The land abutted a pucca road, and defendants—owner of adjacent land—erected a boundary wall between points C and D, blocking plaintiffs’ access. Plaintiffs sued for a mandatory injunction directing removal of the wall; the suit was decreed by the trial and first appellate courts. On second appeal, the Uttarakhand High Court held that injunction-only relief was barred under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act and dismissed the suit. Plaintiffs’ subsequent appeal to this Court was dismissed.

Statutory Analysis

  • Section 41(h), Specific Relief Act, 1963: Bars injunction where an equally efficacious alternative remedy exists.
  • Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Limits second-appeal interference to substantial questions of law arising from lower-court judgments.
  • Section 69, Partnership Act, 1932: Held inapplicable as suit was to protect proprietary rights, not enforce contractual partnership rights.

Alert Indicators

  • ✔ Precedent Followed — Affirms established doctrine on “equally efficacious remedy” and second-appeal jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC.

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