Does Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 Vest an Independent and Continuing Power in a High Court Chief Justice to Appoint Additional Places of Sitting?

 

Summary

Category Data
Court Supreme Court of India
Case Number W.P.(C) No.-000914-000914 – 2025
Diary Number 53500/2025
Judge Name HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR
Bench

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. ANJARIA

Concurring or Dissenting Judges None (unanimous)
Precedent Value Binding authority on the scope and exercise of Section 51(3) powers under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956
Overrules / Affirms Affirms State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik (1982) 3 SCC 519 and related precedents
Type of Law Constitutional law; judicial administration
Questions of Law
  • Construction and scope of Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956
  • Administrative authority of the Chief Justice and need for consultation
  • Effect of past administrative decisions on current powers
  • Limits of judicial review in judicial administration
  • Validity under Articles 14 and 21 (arbitrariness; access to justice)
Ratio Decidendi The Court held that Section 51(3) grants the Chief Justice, with gubernatorial approval, an independent and continuing power to appoint additional places of sitting for the “more convenient transaction of judicial business,” distinct from the permanent-bench power under sub-section (2). The non obstante clause and General Clauses Act, Section 14, support repeated exercise of Section 51(3). Consultation with the Full Court is desirable but not legally mandated. Judicial review is limited to jurisdictional excess, mala fides or manifest illegality, and administrative policy choices—even on access and resource allocation—are not subject to substitution by courts.
Judgments Relied Upon
  • State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik (1982) 3 SCC 519
  • Federation of Bar Associations in Karnataka v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 715
  • State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand (1998) 1 SCC 1
  • R. Suresh Kumar v. Union of India (Madras HC, 2004) SCC OnLine Mad 212
  • Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan (2016) 8 SCC 509
  • E. Ram Mohan Chowdry v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka (Karnataka HC, 2008) SCC OnLine Kar 288
Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon
  • Statutory construction of Section 51: non obstante clause; graded scheme distinguishing sub-sections (1), (2) and (3)
  • General Clauses Act, Section 14: powers may be exercised repeatedly unless excluded
  • Puranik (1982): Section 51(3) is ongoing, does not effect territorial bifurcation
  • Federation Karnataka & Prakash Chand: Chief Justice’s administrative primacy
  • Limits of judicial review: legality, mala fides, arbitrariness; no appeal on merits
  • Articles 14/21 jurisprudence: rational basis; access to justice includes proximity
Facts as Summarised by the Court The petitioner challenged a Bombay High Court administrative notification (No. P.0108/2025, dated 01.08.2025) appointing Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting under Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. The proposal, approved by the Governor on 30.07.2025 and operational from 18.08.2025, aimed to serve litigants from Kolhapur, Sangli, Satara, Ratnagiri and Sindhudurg. The writ petition under Article 32 claimed the power was misused to create a de facto permanent bench without required consultation, breached Articles 14 and 21, and ignored past decisions.

Practical Impact

Category Impact
Binding On All High Courts and subordinate courts on the interpretation and exercise of Section 51(3) powers
Follows State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik (1982) 3 SCC 519; Federation of Bar Associations in Karnataka v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 715; State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand (1998) 1 SCC 1

What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note

  • Confirms Section 51(3) as an independent and continuing power for the Chief Justice, with no temporal or “temporary-bench” limitation.
  • Reaffirms that additional sittings under Section 51(3) do not effect territorial bifurcation or transform into permanent benches under sub-section (2).
  • Holds that consultation with the Full Court, while desirable, is not a statutory requirement under Section 51(3).
  • Clarifies that judicial review of such administrative decisions is limited to jurisdictional excess, mala fides, or manifest arbitrariness.
  • Affirms that rational selection of sitting-locations, based on distance and volume of cases, satisfies Article 14, even if other regions also seek relief.
  • Determines that Article 21’s guarantee of access to justice includes physical proximity, legitimising decentralised High Court sittings.

Summary of Legal Reasoning

  1. Statutory Scheme (Section 51)
    • Section 51(1): Principal seat by Presidential order.
    • Section 51(2): Permanent benches by Presidential order after consultation—territorial bifurcation.
    • Section 51(3): Non obstante clause vests Chief Justice, with Governor’s approval, power to appoint “other places” for convenient transaction of business—no bifurcation.
  2. Puranik Precedent
    • Reproduced and followed paragraph 25: Section 51(3) is ongoing, internal, does not create exclusive jurisdiction.
  3. Administrative Authority & Consultation
    • Chief Justice’s constitutional role includes internal administration of sittings.
    • No legal mandate for Full Court resolution; consultation is an administrative convention, not a statutory precondition.
  4. Past Decisions & Change of Approach
    • Earlier committee rejections do not estop future exercises of statutory power; administrative policy is contextual and revisitable.
  5. Limits of Judicial Review
    • Review confined to jurisdictional excess, mala fides or manifest irrationality; merits of administrative choice are beyond judicial substitution.
  6. Article 14 (Equality)
    • Rational basis test: choice of Kolhapur reflects distance and litigant convenience; differential treatment does not equal arbitrariness.
  7. Article 21 (Access to Justice)
    • Proximity furthers the right of access to courts; decentralised sittings advance constitutionally guaranteed access.

Arguments by the Parties

Petitioner

  • Section 51(3) meant for temporary exigencies, not permanent additional benches.
  • Lack of Full Court consultation violates institutional norms and precedents.
  • Past committee decisions (1996, 1997, 2006, 2018) rejecting additional benches were ignored.
  • Selection of Kolhapur over similarly deserving Pune/Solapur irrationally discriminatory (Article 14).
  • Diverting judges/infrastructure undermines district judiciary and access to justice (Article 21).
  • No transparent, data-driven process as in Karnataka bench setups at Dharwad/Kalaburagi.

Respondents

  • Section 51(3) is an independent, continuing source of power for the Chief Justice—upheld in Puranik.
  • Chief Justice’s administrative domain includes bench-location decisions; approval of Governor suffices.
  • Consultation and past admin views are good practice but not statutorily mandated; policy decisions contextual.
  • Rational selection based on geography, volume and infrastructure; no entitlement for simultaneous demands.
  • Decentralisation brings courts closer to litigants and furthers Article 21; resource allocation is for policy, not review.

Factual Background

A writ petition under Article 32 challenged a Bombay High Court administrative notification (No. P.0108/2025 dated 01.08.2025), issued by exercising power under Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, to appoint Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting for Judges and Division Courts. The notification, approved by the Governor on 30.07.2025 and operational from 18.08.2025, aimed to serve litigants from Kolhapur, Sangli, Satara, Ratnagiri and Sindhudurg. The petitioner claimed the decision was constitutionally and statutorily invalid and sought quashing of the notification.

Statutory Analysis

States Reorganisation Act, 1956, Section 51

  • Sub-section (1): President appoints principal seat.
  • Sub-section (2): President may establish permanent benches after consultation (Governor & Chief Justice)—entails territorial bifurcation.
  • Sub-section (3): Chief Justice, with Governor’s approval, may appoint “other place(s)” for sittings—non obstante clause; no bifurcation; power exercisable repeatedly (General Clauses Act, Section 14).

General Clauses Act, 1897, Section 14

Confirms that a statutory power may be exercised from time to time unless a contrary intention appears.

Alert Indicators

  • ✔ Precedent Followed – Reaffirms established law under Section 51(3) and Chief Justice’s administrative authority.

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