Does Section 142(2)(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 confine jurisdiction for account-payee cheque offences to the branch where the payee maintains the account?

 

Summary

Category Data
Court Supreme Court of India
Case Number T.P.(Crl.) No.-001099-001099 – 2025
Diary Number 24362/2025
Judge Name HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA
Bench HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA, HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE K.V. VISWANATHAN
Precedent Value Binding authority
Overrules / Affirms
  • Overrules “per incuriam” interpretation in Yogesh Upadhyay v. Atlanta Ltd.
  • Affirms Bridgestone India Ltd. v. Inderpal Singh and Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.
Type of Law Criminal – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; procedural jurisdiction
Questions of Law
  • Whether after the Amendment Act, 2015 the home branch of the payee’s account alone fixes territorial jurisdiction for a Section 138 complaint?
  • Whether complaints where Section 145(2) evidence has begun must remain in the original court?
Ratio Decidendi

The Amendment Act, 2015 introduced Section 142(2)(a)–(b) as a special code fixing jurisdiction for cheque-dishonour offences by reference to the branch of the bank where the payee or drawer maintains an account. “Delivery for collection” in 142(2)(a) identifies an account-payee cheque, but jurisdiction is anchored at the home branch by the Explanation. Prior broad readings (Bhaskaran, Harman Electronics) gave way to a strict territorial scheme upheld here. Per incuriam decisions that read delivery-oriented jurisdiction are rejected. Pending trials beyond Section 145(2) remain in the original court despite lack of statutory jurisdiction.

Judgments Relied Upon
  • K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan
  • Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. v. National Panasonic India (P) Ltd.
  • Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra
  • Bridgestone India (P) Ltd. v. Inderpal Singh
  • Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.
  • Bijoy Kumar Moni v. Paresh Manna
Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon by the Court
  • Textual reading of Sections 138, 142(2), Definitions (Sections 7, 46, 64 NIA), Explanation to Section 142(2)(a)
  • CrPC Sections 177–179
  • Distinction between “delivery” and “presentment”
  • Special statute overrules general CrPC provisions
Facts as Summarised by the Court

A company in Kolkata (drawer) issued an account-payee cheque for ₹19,94,996 to a Bhopal-based company (payee), which dishonoured on insufficiency. The payee filed a Section 138 complaint in Kolkata, summons were issued and evidence began before the 2015 Amendment. Upon enactment of Section 142(2), MM Kolkata returned the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Complaint was re-filed in JMFC Bhopal. Accused sought transfer back to Kolkata relying on Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod; complainant relied on Section 142(2) jurisdiction in Bhopal.

Practical Impact

Category Impact
Binding On All Metropolitan Magistrates and Judicial Magistrates First Class trying Section 138 NI Act offences
Persuasive For High Courts, trial courts and legal practitioners handling cheque-dishonour litigation
Overrules Yogesh Upadhyay v. Atlanta Ltd. (2023) – delivery-oriented jurisdiction for account-payee cheques
Distinguishes
  • K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (1999) on multi-venue complaints
  • Harman Electronics (2009) on notice service accrual
Follows
  • Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra (2014) for pending trials beyond Section 145(2)
  • Bridgestone India (2016)
  • Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries (2025)

What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note

  • Clarifies that for account-payee cheques, “delivered for collection through an account” under Section 142(2)(a) identifies the cheque type, but jurisdiction lies exclusively at the home branch where the payee maintains the account by virtue of the Explanation.
  • Rejects per incuriam readings (e.g., Yogesh Upadhyay) that accord primacy to the branch where the cheque was physically delivered.
  • Affirms that the special jurisdiction scheme in Section 142(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 overrides general CrPC Sections 177–179.
  • Pending Section 138 complaints in which evidence under Section 145(2) has commenced must continue in the original court despite lacking jurisdiction under Section 142(2), to meet ends of justice.
  • Lawyers can cite this judgment as binding authority on territorial jurisdiction and transfer of pending cheque-dishonour cases.

Summary of Legal Reasoning

  1. Pre-2015 jurisprudence on Section 138 jurisdiction:
    • Bhaskaran: Multifarious acts (“drawing”, “presentation”, “dishonour”, “notice”, “non-payment”) across different localities gave complainant wide choice of courts under CrPC Sections 177–179.
    • Harman Electronics: Cause of action accrues on service (not issue) of notice; rejected issuance-based jurisdiction.
    • Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod: Offence committed on dishonour by drawee bank; jurisdiction strictly at drawee bank’s location; “cause of action” concept inapplicable to criminal jurisdiction.
  2. Amendment Act, 2015:
    • Inserts Section 142(2)(a)–(b) fixing special jurisdiction: (a) account-payee cheques by home branch where payee maintains account; (b) bearer cheques by home branch where drawer maintains account.
    • Explanation to 142(2)(a) deems delivery at any branch as delivery at home branch for jurisdiction.
  3. Interpretation of key terms:
    • Delivery (Section 46 NIA) vs Presentment (Section 64 NIA).
    • “Maintains an account” means the account-holder’s home branch relationship (Bijoy Kumar Moni).
  4. Precedents on amended Section 142(2)(a):
    • Bridgestone India: correctly applied home-branch jurisdiction.
    • Yogesh Upadhyay: misread delivery-only jurisdiction, treated per incuriam.
    • Shri Sendhur Agro: emphasized “through account” element but did not disturb home branch rule.
  5. Conclusion:
    • Jurisdiction for account-payee cheque offences remains at the home branch; third-party or multi-branch delivery does not shift jurisdiction.
    • Pending trials beyond Section 145(2) stay in the court where evidence began.

Arguments by the Parties

Petitioner (Accused Company)

  • Trial in MM, Kolkata had advanced to evidence under Section 145(2) before Amendment; Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod bars reopening in a new venue.
  • MM, Kolkata summons, framing of charge, and record of evidence render it the proper forum to continue trial.

Respondent (Complainant Company)

  • Amendment Act, 2015 (Section 142(2)(a)) vests exclusive jurisdiction in the court where the payee maintained its bank account (JMFC Bhopal).
  • MM, Kolkata rightly returned complaint for lack of jurisdiction; transfer back to Kolkata undermines the special statute.

Factual Background

A Kolkata-based company issued a ₹19,94,996 account-payee cheque to a Bhopal-based company. The cheque was dishonoured; statutory notice was issued and served. The payee filed a Section 138 complaint in MM, Kolkata where summons and evidence-in-chief commenced in April 2015. The 2015 Amendment (Section 142(2)) shifted jurisdiction to Bhopal (payee’s home branch); MM, Kolkata returned the complaint. Complainant re-filed in JMFC Bhopal; accused sought transfer back to Kolkata, invoking Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod on commenced-evidence exception. The Sessions Court challenge is pending.

Statutory Analysis

  • Section 138 NIA, 1881: primary offence on cheque dishonour; proviso requires notice and 15-day non-payment.
  • Section 142 NIA, as amended:
    • (1)(a)–(c): procedure, time-bar, court hierarchy.
    • (2)(a): account-payee cheques – trial only where branch of payee’s maintained account is situated.
    • (2)(b): bearer cheques – trial only where branch of drawer’s maintained account is situated.
    • Explanation: any branch delivery deemed to home branch.
  • Section 142A NIA, 1881: transitory provision for transfer/validation of pending cases.
  • CrPC Sections 177–179: general territorial rules; displaced by the special code in NIA.

Procedural Innovations

  • Exclusive statutory jurisdiction scheme for cheque-dishonour offences under Section 142(2), removing CrPC ambiguity.
  • Deeming fiction in Explanation to Section 142(2)(a) to balance commercial convenience with legal certainty.
  • Section 142A validates transfer or continuation of pending complaints, especially those past Section 145(2).

Alert Indicators

  • 🚨 Breaking Precedent – Overrules per incuriam decision in Yogesh Upadhyay v. Atlanta Ltd.
  • ✔ Precedent Followed – Bridgestone India (P) Ltd. v. Inderpal Singh; Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.
  • 🔄 Conflicting Decisions – Rejects broader “delivery-based” jurisdiction in Yogesh Upadhyay that conflicted with the statutory text and Explanation.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Recent Comments

No comments to show.