The Jharkhand High Court holds that a sale deed cannot be declared void for violation of Section 46 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, unless there is a foundational pleading in the written statement specifically challenging the transfer for want of permission from the Deputy Commissioner. The judgment upholds this as a binding precedent within the Jharkhand High Court’s jurisdiction and clarifies limits on courts’ powers to decide factual questions not pleaded. The case further reaffirms that plaintiffs may seek title by adverse possession under Article 65, correcting contrary observations in lower courts, and sets important precedent regarding limitation and evidentiary burdens in property disputes.
Summary
| Category | Data |
|---|---|
| Case Name | SA/241/2018 of SMT RUBI RAI TIRKEY ALIAS R TIRKEY Vs STATE OF JHARKHAND |
| CNR | JHHC010192652018 |
| Date of Registration | 22-06-2018 |
| Decision Date | 31-10-2025 |
| Disposal Nature | Allowed |
| Judgment Author | HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY |
| Court | High Court of Jharkhand |
| Bench | Single Bench |
| Precedent Value | Binding within jurisdiction of the Jharkhand High Court; clarifies and sets important precedents on pleading and evidentiary principles in property law and adverse possession. |
| Overrules / Affirms | Overrules lower courts’ judgments; declines to follow contrary interpretations about pleading of Section 46 CNT Act and adverse possession as to maintainability as a “sword”. |
| Type of Law | Property law; Limitation law; Tenancy law (Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, Bihar Land Reforms Act) |
| Questions of Law |
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| Ratio Decidendi | The judgment holds that the requirement of permission from the Deputy Commissioner under Section 46 of the CNT Act is a question of fact and must be specifically pleaded by parties. In the absence of such foundational pleading in the written statement, courts cannot hold a sale deed to be void on this ground. The court further clarifies, following Supreme Court precedent, that a plaintiff can claim title by adverse possession, not only as a defence but as a direct claim. The suit challenging a revenue/settlement entry is not barred by limitation if the cause of action arose only upon threatened dispossession, not from the date of mere existence of a wrong record entry. Lower courts’ disregard for Exhibit 5 (rejection of State’s objection at draft publication) was erroneous and material for title/presumption. |
| Judgments Relied Upon |
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| Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon by the Court | Requirement of foundational pleading for factual issues; title not disturbed without challenge to sale deed; limitation for declaratory relief runs not from mere erroneous record entry but from date of knowledge/threat/actual interference; civil court’s approach to presumption and rebuttal of record of rights; Supreme Court’s exposition of adverse possession as both “sword” and “shield”. |
| Facts as Summarised by the Court | The plaintiff relied on a registered sale deed (1956) from Ladura Ho (Scheduled Tribe) to her mother, with possession continuous since then. Forest Department’s entry in the 1979 record of rights listed the State as owner, initial proceedings under Section 83 CNT Act (1972-73) failed; plaintiff only learned about the entry upon threat of dispossession in 2005, then took legal action. Defendant-State claimed sale deed was void for want of permission under Section 46 CNT Act, that suit was barred by limitation, and relied on record entries showing State as owner. Lower courts agreed with defendants, but did not have specific pleading or evidence on Section 46 violation. |
Practical Impact
| Category | Impact |
|---|---|
| Binding On | All subordinate courts within Jharkhand High Court’s jurisdiction. |
| Persuasive For | Other High Courts; particularly in similar fact and property law situations involving the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act and limitation issues in property disputes. |
| Overrules | Overrules concurrent findings of the lower courts in the present matter (Trial Court and First Appellate Court, Jamshedpur, Civil Appeal No.03 of 2017, TS 11/2006). |
| Follows | Supreme Court decisions including: Ravinder Kaur Grewal (2019); Daya Singh (2010); L.N. Aswathama (2009). |
What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note
- The court clarifies that a sale deed cannot be declared void ab initio for want of permission under Section 46 CNT Act unless the defendant specifically pleads this as a foundational fact in the written statement.
- The absence of any pleading or evidence on a fact-specific issue precludes the court from declaring the transaction void for that reason.
- Reaffirms that plaintiffs can claim title by adverse possession under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, not just as a defence (following Ravinder Kaur Grewal’s overruling of contrary precedent).
- Entry in revenue or settlement records, standing alone, does not start limitation; cause of action arises upon actual threat or interference, not mere publication or existence of a wrong entry (as per Daya Singh and this judgment).
- Presumptions arising from record-of-rights can be rebutted by long, unchanged possession and production of a valid, unchallenged sale deed.
- Courts must consider relevant evidence (like Exhibit 5 rejection of State’s earlier objection) and cannot ignore such evidence in deciding title/limitation.
- Important for practitioners in Chotanagpur Tenancy Act regime and property suits requiring declaration of title, correction of records, and contesting voidness of sale deeds.
Summary of Legal Reasoning
- The court first examined whether the sale deed (from tribal vendor to non-tribal vendee) could be declared void under Section 46 CNT Act on the ground that no permission was shown to have been taken from the Deputy Commissioner. The court held that, absent a specific plea in the written statement or any foundational pleading by the defendants, this issue could not be decided against the plaintiff. Sections 83, 86, 89 and 96 of CNT Act pleaded by defendants do not deal with such requirement.
- Next, the court addressed whether the lower courts’ holding that adverse possession could not be claimed by a plaintiff was correct. Citing Ravinder Kaur Grewal (2019) and other authorities, the court confirmed that adverse possession may be set up as a primary ground (“sword”) by a plaintiff.
- On limitation, the court found that mere publication of a wrong record of rights entry does not start the limitation clock against the person in possession; the suit was not barred, as the cause of action only arose in 2005 upon actual threat.
- The court found Exhibit 5 (rejection of State’s objection at draft publication stage) was material and wrongly disregarded by the lower courts. This evidence, along with long, continued possession and an unchallenged registered sale deed, rebutted the State’s claim.
- The court noted the absence of any defendant evidence to support vesting under Bihar Land Reforms Act or to support the correctness of the record-of-rights entry.
- As a result, the lower courts’ findings were set aside; the sale deed stands, adverse possession may be claimed by plaintiffs, limitation was not applicable, and the plaintiff declared entitled to relief.
Arguments by the Parties
Petitioner (Appellant / Plaintiff):
- Asserted right and title over the property based on a registered sale deed from 1956 and long-standing possession.
- Challenged entries in the record of rights as erroneous and argued that limitation ran only from date of actual threat, not the date of record publication.
- Claimed that the sale deed was unfairly held void without any foundational pleading by State as to violation of Section 46 CNT Act.
- Presented Exhibit 5 (rejection of State’s objection at draft publication stage) in support of her continued and lawful possession and title.
- Argued, following Supreme Court precedent, that adverse possession can be claimed proactively by a plaintiff.
- Stated that foundational pleading of adverse possession was in the plaint.
Respondent (State / Defendants):
- Claimed that sale deed was void due to absence of required permission under Section 46 CNT Act (vendor was Scheduled Tribe, vendee was Christian).
- Asserted plaintiff was in “illegal occupation”; suit not maintainable; suit barred by limitation.
- Objected to plaintiff’s simultaneous plea of title by purchase and adverse possession as inconsistent.
- Relied on correctness presumption of record-of-rights entry showing the State/Government as owner.
- Argued that the suit should have been filed within 12 years of final record publication.
Factual Background
The plaintiff claimed title and possession of suit land in East Singhbhum, Jharkhand, based on a registered sale deed executed by Ladura Ho in 1956 in favour of her mother, which was never challenged by the State. Following the final publication of the record of rights in 1979, the land was recorded in the name of the State (Ban Bibhag Bihar Sarkar), with the plaintiff’s mother shown in alleged illegal possession since 1971. The plaintiff only learned of this adverse entry after being threatened with dispossession by Forest Department staff in 2005, after which she filed the suit seeking declaration of title and correction of the revenue records. The State’s objections to the plaintiff’s/mother’s possession had been previously rejected (Exhibit 5) at the draft record-of-rights stage in 1973.
Statutory Analysis
- Section 46, Chota Nagpur Tenancy (CNT) Act, 1908: Restricts transfer of tribal land without permission of Deputy Commissioner. The court held that violation of Section 46 is a question of fact and must be specifically pleaded by the party alleging such violation. In the absence of a pleading, courts cannot suo motu declare the sale deed void on this ground.
- Sections 83, 86, 89, 96 CNT Act: Deal with procedures for making, objecting to, and publishing record-of-rights; not with validity of transfers.
- Limitation Act, Article 58 and Article 65: Applied per Supreme Court (Daya Singh (2010)), limitation for declaration/rectification of entry runs from date of actual threatened interference, not from mere entry date; adverse possession claims require fulfillment of criteria, but may be initiated by a plaintiff.
- Presumption of correctness of Record-of-Rights (Section 84 CNT Act): Presumption can be rebutted with strong evidence, such as long, consistent possession and a registered unchallenged sale deed.
Dissenting / Concurring Opinion Summary
No dissenting or concurring opinions were delivered; the judgment is authored by a single judge.
Procedural Innovations
- Clarifies and strengthens the requirement that courts may not decide issues of fact absent foundational pleadings by parties, especially regarding statutory bar to transfer of land under special laws.
- Restates the evidentiary value of record-of-rights versus unchallenged registered documents and long-term possession.
- Mandates consideration of all relevant exhibits and prior administrative proceedings (exhibit-5).
Alert Indicators
- ✔ Precedent Followed – Judgment applies/reaffirms Supreme Court precedent (esp. Ravinder Kaur Grewal, Daya Singh)
- 🚨 Breaking Precedent – Overrules/constrains lower courts’ approach to Section 46 CNT Act and adverse possession as sword, not shield