This judgment holds that, in the absence of foundational pleadings, courts cannot declare a registered sale deed void for violation of Section 46 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. It further reaffirms that adverse possession can be claimed as a basis for declaratory relief by plaintiffs, not just defendants. The judgment sets aside decisions of lower courts that ignored these principles, clarifies the computation of limitation for challenging revenue entries, and stands as binding authority within Jharkhand.
Summary
| Category | Data |
|---|---|
| Case Name | SA/241/2018 of SMT RUBI RAI TIRKEY ALIAS R TIRKEY Vs STATE OF JHARKHAND CNR JHHC010192652018 |
| Date of Registration | 22-06-2018 |
| Decision Date | 31-10-2025 |
| Disposal Nature | Allowed |
| Judgment Author | Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Anubha Rawat Choudhary |
| Court | High Court of Jharkhand |
| Bench | Single Bench (Justice Anubha Rawat Choudhary) |
| Precedent Value | Binding within jurisdiction of Jharkhand High Court |
| Overrules / Affirms | Sets aside/treats as perverse and illegal the lower courts’ (trial and first appellate) findings regarding Section 46 CNT Act and limitation |
| Type of Law | Civil / Property / Tenancy Law / Adverse Possession / Limitation |
| Questions of Law |
|
| Ratio Decidendi |
Courts cannot decide on violation of Section 46 of the CNT Act in the absence of foundational pleadings in defence. Absence of Deputy Commissioner’s permission is a question of fact and not automatically fatal unless pleaded and established by evidence. On adverse possession, plaintiffs may use the doctrine as a sword based on Supreme Court authority (Ravinder Kaur Grewal). Limitation for challenging revenue record entry accrues only upon real threat or knowledge, not on mere publication of wrong entry; earlier proceedings regarding draft entries do not impute knowledge of final entries. Lower courts’ failure to consider critical evidence (Exhibit 5—Rejection of State’s objections) amounted to perversity. Plaintiff entitled to declaration of title and correction of record-of-rights. |
| Judgments Relied Upon |
|
| Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon by the Court |
Foundational pleadings are essential for a fact-based bar or defence such as under Section 46, CNT Act; pleadings must be specific and the question must be put to the party before adverse finding. Adverse possession can support a plaintiff’s case. Limitations run from accrual of cause of action/threat, not publication of entry per se. Registered sale deeds enjoy presumption of validity unless void ab initio and so declared after contest. |
| Facts as Summarised by the Court |
Plaintiff’s late mother purchased property via sale deed in 1956 from Ladura Ho; record-of-rights in 1979 recorded land in name of ‘Ban Bibhag Bihar Sarkar’, but also noted plaintiff’s family’s possession. State’s objection at draft stage (1973) was rejected (Exhibit 5). Plaintiff claimed title and adverse possession. Suit filed in 2006 after Forest Dept. threatened dispossession. Both trial and first appellate courts dismissed claim, holding sale deed invalid (no Section 46 permission), suit barred by limitation, and adverse possession unavailable to plaintiff. The High Court held the sale deed could not be declared void for want of Section 46 permission without pleading, affirmed adverse possession doctrine per Supreme Court, and clarified the law on limitation and evidentiary presumption. |
Practical Impact
| Category | Impact |
|---|---|
| Binding On | All subordinate courts in Jharkhand; binds trial and first appellate courts within jurisdiction. |
| Persuasive For | Other High Courts; potential persuasive value nationally (especially on pleading standards and adverse possession claims as sword). |
| Overrules | Implicitly overrules/sets aside the findings of trial and first appellate courts below concerning Section 46 CNT Act, limitation calculation, and evidence use. |
| Follows | Follows: Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019) 8 SCC 729 (on adverse possession); Daya Singh v. Gurdev Singh (2010) 2 SCC 194 (on limitation accrual) |
What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note
- A court cannot declare a sale deed void for want of Deputy Commissioner’s permission under Section 46 CNT Act on its own; there must be a specific, adequately pleaded ground by the defendant.
- The absence of foundational pleadings about Section 46 cannot be made up for by mere suggestion or references in pleadings to other CNT Act provisions.
- Adverse possession can be invoked as both shield and sword; plaintiffs may seek declaratory relief on this ground, per latest Supreme Court precedent.
- Entry made in records of rights enjoys only a rebuttable presumption; the presumption can be displaced by older registered sale deeds and unchallenged possession.
- The period of limitation to challenge an entry in the records of rights runs from knowledge of entry/threat to rights, not from entry’s publication, as clarified by Supreme Court in Daya Singh.
- Defendant/State must lead evidence to challenge title and possession, not rely solely on presumption from revenue entries.
- A registered sale deed older than 30 years is presumed valid unless set aside through proper suit and evidence.
- Lawyers should insist on strict compliance with pleading standards for statutory bars such as those under Section 46 CNT Act.
Summary of Legal Reasoning
- Foundational Pleadings on Section 46 CNT Act: The court reasoned that neither the State nor defendants pleaded that the 1956 sale was void for lack of permission (Section 46). Only Sections 83, 86, 89, and 96 CNT Act were cited, none covering Section 46. Therefore, the courts below were in error in holding the sale void ab initio; these are fact questions and require specific allegations and evidence.
- Presumption of Revenue Entries: The court interpreted Section 84 CNT Act to mean record-of-rights entries are presumed correct until disproved; here, the plaintiff’s registered deed and unchallenged (and judicially confirmed) possession rebutted this presumption.
- Adverse Possession as “Sword”: Relying on Ravinder Kaur Grewal (2019), the court confirmed that adverse possession can ground a plaintiff’s positive title claim, not just a defence. This overcomes an error in the first appellate court’s legal reasoning.
- Limitation Calculation: The court, invoking Daya Singh (2010), held that limitation for declaratory title suits about revenue entries starts when the plaintiff has knowledge of a threat to their rights—not mere publication of entry or awareness of draft, but actual or likely infringement.
- Exhibit 5 (Objection Rejection): Courts below failed to give proper importance to Exhibit 5, which rejected the State’s objections at the draft entry stage, confirming the plaintiff’s predecessor’s title and possession.
- Failure of the State: The defendants/state led no evidence to establish how the land vested, nor did they challenge or counterclaim against the sale deed or longstanding possession. Their reliance on presumption, without proof, was insufficient.
- Relief: As a cumulative effect, the plaintiff was granted declaratory title and the erroneous entry corrected.
Arguments by the Parties
Petitioner
- Asserted plaintiff’s title via registered Sale Deed No. 3518 (1956); possession since then.
- Contended that no pleading was made by the State about lack of Section 46 CNT Act permission; thus, lower courts erred in voiding the sale on this basis.
- Claimed limitation runs from 2005, when dispossession was threatened, not 1979 publication.
- Relied on Daya Singh v. Gurdev Singh (2010) 2 SCC 194 regarding limitation accrual and Ravinder Kaur Grewal (2019) for adverse possession as sword.
- Argued that both trial and appellate courts wrongly ignored Exhibit 5 (State’s objection dismissed).
- Submitted that adverse possession was properly pleaded in the plaint (paras 7 & 8) and can be simultaneously claimed with title in light of Supreme Court rulings.
- Highlighted that the State neither filed a counterclaim nor sought recovery despite knowledge.
Respondent (State)
- Asserted suit barred by limitation and by law (CNT Act, Section 80 CPC, Bihar Land Reforms Act, Specific Relief Act).
- Denied plaintiff’s title and claimed possession over suit land.
- Argued that sale deed was void as it lacked Deputy Commissioner’s permission, since vendor was tribal and vendee was not.
- Stated adverse possession and title claims are inconsistent and cannot be raised together.
- Relied on presumption of correctness of revenue entries in State’s name.
- Asserted plaintiff failed to adduce required evidence, including foundational facts for adverse possession.
- Claimed plaintiff was an encroacher liable to be evicted by law.
Factual Background
The plaintiff’s mother purchased the disputed land by registered sale deed in 1956 from Ladura Ho. Subsequent to the Bihar Land Reforms Act, the land purportedly vested in the State, though the plaintiff remained in possession. In 1979, the record-of-rights was published, showing the suit land in the name of “Ban Bibhag Bihar Sarkar,” but also stating that the plaintiff’s family held possession since 1971. In 1973, the State’s attempt to object to the draft record entry (prayed for before Assistant Settlement Officer) was rejected (Exhibit 5). In 2005, the plaintiff was threatened with dispossession based on the revenue entry and thus sought declaratory relief in 2006 claiming title, correction of records, and a permanent injunction.
Statutory Analysis
- Section 46, Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act: Restricts transfer of tribal land without Deputy Commissioner’s permission; but constitutes a mixed question of law and fact requiring specific pleadings and evidence.
- Section 83, 86, 89, 96, CNT Act: Concern publication, amendment, and settlement of records—not transfer permissions.
- Section 84, CNT Act: Presumption about correctness of final record-of-rights; rebuttable by contrary evidence.
- Sections 65, 112, Limitation Act: Addresses limitation periods for recovery against State and for adverse possession.
- Article 58, Limitation Act: Limitation period for declaratory relief begins upon accrual of cause of action (i.e., when rights are threatened, not merely by publication of wrong entry).
- Section 80, CPC: Notice requirement to government entities prior to suing.
- The court declined to “read in” requirements not specifically pleaded or evidenced by the State.
Procedural Innovations
- Reasserts that courts must align findings with pleadings and evidence, especially for statutory bars.
- Clarifies the use of substantial question of law framework for appeals against concurrent findings, setting precedent in property/tenancy law for future pleadings and evidence evaluation.
Alert Indicators
- ✔ Precedent Followed – Reliance on and application of Supreme Court rulings on pleadings, limitation, adverse possession.
- 🚨 Breaking Precedent – Sets aside earlier error of law in concurrent findings by lower courts; clarifies principles regarding pleading-based statutory bars under tenancy law.