Can the High Court Direct the Debts Recovery Tribunal to Entertain Interlocutory Applications When Proceedings Are Ongoing? Upholding the Tribunal’s Primary Jurisdiction and Limiting Writ Interference—Binding Authority for Writ Petitions under Article 226 in SARFAESI/DRT Proceedings

Where procedural grievances arise during the pendency of proceedings before a statutory tribunal (here, DRT under SARFAESI Act), the High Court affirms that writ jurisdiction is declined, and parties must await the Tribunal’s orders before seeking judicial review; this reinforces established precedent and will operate as binding authority for future similar writ petitions in the banking and financial recovery sector.

 

Summary

Category Data
Case Name WP/38742/2025 of VENKATESH RAJASEKARAN Vs STATE BANK OF INDIA PAN NO. aaacs8577k
CNR HCMA012449802025
Date of Registration 09-10-2025
Decision Date 30-10-2025
Disposal Nature DISMISSED
Judgment Author HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA
Concurring or Dissenting Judges HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE G.ARUL MURUGAN (concurring)
Court Madras High Court
Bench Chief Justice Manindra Mohan Shrivastava and Justice G. Arul Murugan
Precedent Value Binding on subordinate courts and persuasive for tribunals in similar matters
Overrules / Affirms Affirms existing principles limiting writ jurisdiction when alternative statutory remedies exist
Type of Law Procedural / Administrative Law – Banking & Finance (SARFAESI/DRT)
Questions of Law Whether the High Court should exercise writ jurisdiction to issue directions to the DRT to entertain or decide an interlocutory application during ongoing proceedings
Ratio Decidendi The Court held that when a statutory tribunal like the DRT is seized of a matter, and a grievance arises concerning procedure or interlocutory applications, intervention under Article 226 is unwarranted. The correct legal course is for the aggrieved party to await the Tribunal’s order, whereupon appellate or writ remedies may be exercised against that order. All objections, including those raised in the writ petition, may thus be agitated by way of regular statutory remedies after orders are passed by the Tribunal. The High Court thus declined to issue a writ of mandamus, reiterating the primacy of Tribunal jurisdiction during the pendency of matters under SARFAESI Act provisions.
Facts as Summarised by the Court The petitioner’s interlocutory application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal was allegedly not being taken on record, and analogous hearing of two related cases was denied. The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus for directions to the Tribunal to entertain and number the IA and dispose of it expeditiously.

Practical Impact

Category Impact
Binding On All subordinate courts in Tamil Nadu and the Debts Recovery Tribunal, within the Madras High Court’s jurisdiction
Persuasive For Other High Courts and DRTs in similar contexts
Follows Affirms established principles limiting writ jurisdiction during pendency of proceedings before statutory tribunals, as in the SARFAESI/DRT regime

What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note

  • Reinforces that writ petitions for mandamus to direct DRT to entertain, number, or dispose interlocutory applications are not maintainable during the pendency of DRT proceedings.
  • Affirms that grievances regarding non-receipt or non-numbering of interlocutory applications must be raised before the Tribunal or by way of challenge after the Tribunal has issued a final order.
  • Lawyers should not seek writ directions against DRT procedure during live proceedings but preserve all issues for challenge after the Tribunal’s decision.
  • All objections—including those raised in the writ petition—can be fully agitated in subsequent statutory or appellate proceedings after the DRT order.

Summary of Legal Reasoning

  • The Court observed that the petitioner’s primary grievance pertained to the interlocutory application not being taken on record and the non-analogous hearing of two cases before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
  • The Court reasoned that, as the Tribunal was already seized of the matter, the correct procedure is for the petitioner to await the Tribunal’s order.
  • After the DRT passes its order, the petitioner is at liberty to challenge it, raising all relevant objections, including those brought before the High Court in this writ petition.
  • The High Court therefore declined to interfere under Article 226, reaffirming the established legal position that statutory remedies must be exhausted before invoking writ jurisdiction, particularly in SARFAESI and DRT contexts.
  • No directions were issued to the Tribunal; the writ petition was dismissed, but liberty was expressly granted to raise all objections post-Tribunal orders.

Arguments by the Parties

Petitioner

  • Complained that the interlocutory application was not being taken on record by the DRT.
  • Argued that both related cases should be heard together (analogously) by the Tribunal.
  • Sought a writ of mandamus to direct the DRT to entertain and dispose of the interlocutory application promptly.

Respondent (State Bank of India)

  • Submissions recorded as representation; specific counter-arguments (if any) not detailed in the order.

Factual Background

The petitioner filed an interlocutory application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III in proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, relating to T.S.A No.480/2023. The application was reportedly not being taken on record by the Tribunal. Additionally, the petitioner sought analogous hearing of two related cases before the Tribunal, but the request was denied and one case was reserved for orders. The writ petition sought High Court directions to the Tribunal to take up and dispose of the IA within a fixed time-frame.

Statutory Analysis

  • The judgment refers to Section 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, and Section 19(25) of the RDB Act, 1993.
  • The substantive interpretation given is that procedural grievances regarding taking on record or hearing of applications must first be addressed before the Tribunal.
  • No expansive or restrictive interpretation of the statutory provisions is undertaken; instead, the statutory framework is cited to affirm the primary jurisdiction of the Tribunal to manage its own proceedings.

Dissenting / Concurring Opinion Summary

Both judges (Chief Justice Manindra Mohan Shrivastava and Justice G. Arul Murugan) concurred in dismissing the writ petition and granting the petitioner liberty to challenge the DRT’s orders subsequently.

Procedural Innovations

The Court clarifies that the petitioner retains full liberty to raise all objections (including procedural ones) after the DRT has rendered its decision, thus preserving the petitioner’s right to appellate or judicial review at a later stage.

Alert Indicators

  • ✔ Precedent Followed – Confirms existing law limiting writ jurisdiction where alternative statutory remedies before a specialized tribunal are available.

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