Does Prolonged Delay in Criminal Trials Justify Reduction of Sentence to Period Already Undergone?—Upholding Judicial Discretion Over Quantum of Sentence

The High Court clarifies that courts may reduce the quantum of sentence to the period already undergone by the accused when there is extraordinary delay in prosecution, reinforcing judicial discretion as recognized in established Supreme Court precedents. The decision affirms existing law and serves as binding authority within the jurisdiction for cases involving inordinate trial delays.

 

Summary

Category Data
Case Name CRA-S/1014/2010 of SANJU @ SANJAY Vs STATE OF HARYANA
CNR PHHC010126412010
Date of Registration 23-04-2010
Decision Date 30-10-2025
Disposal Nature DISPOSED OF
Judgment Author MR. JUSTICE H.S. GREWAL
Court High Court of Punjab and Haryana
Precedent Value Binding within Punjab and Haryana; persuasive elsewhere
Overrules / Affirms Affirms trial court conviction; modifies sentence
Type of Law Criminal Law—Sentencing Discretion
Questions of Law Whether prolonged delay in criminal trial and period already undergone in custody/undergoing trial justifies reduction in sentence.
Ratio Decidendi

The Court reaffirmed the principle that when a convicted person has faced an inordinate delay in trial and has undergone a major part of the sentence, courts may reduce the quantum of sentence to the period already undergone, balancing the gravity of offence, age of accused, and proportionality.

Judicial precedents on the discretion in sentencing were relied upon, especially in the context of non-trivial delay. The power to reduce sentence in such circumstances is not arbitrary but is to be exercised judiciously, considering the facts and agony suffered.

The court emphasized the value of the right to speedy trial and the need to temper punishment with reformation possibilities.

Judgments Relied Upon
  • Deo Narain Mandal v. State of UP (2004) 7 SCC 257
  • Ravada Sasikala v. State of AP AIR 2017 SC 1166
  • Haripada Das v. State of West Bengal (1998) 9 SCC 678
  • Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra 2012 2 SCC 648
Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon by the Court Judicial discretion in sentencing, proportionality, right to speedy trial, exemplary and reformative aspects of punishment, established Supreme Court guidelines on sentence modification in delayed cases
Facts as Summarised by the Court The appellant and others were apprehended while planning a dacoity. Firearms and weapons were recovered. He was convicted under Sections 399/402 IPC and Section 25 of Arms Act. He had already undergone over 3 years of sentence as against 7 years awarded and faced a trial lasting over 16 years. His challenge was limited to reduction of sentence only.

Practical Impact

Category Impact
Binding On All subordinate courts in Punjab and Haryana
Persuasive For Other High Courts, Supreme Court
Follows
  • Deo Narain Mandal v. State of UP (2004) 7 SCC 257
  • Haripada Das v. State of West Bengal (1998) 9 SCC 678
  • Ravada Sasikala v. State of AP AIR 2017 SC 1166
  • Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra 2012 2 SCC 648

What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note

  • Reinforces courts’ discretion to reduce sentences where the accused has undergone substantial custody and faced prolonged prosecution, even after the conviction is upheld.
  • Prolonged delay of over 16 years in prosecution was a key consideration, aligning with Supreme Court guidance.
  • Enhanced fine (from ₹2,000 to ₹10,000) can be imposed in lieu of further custodial sentence in similar cases.
  • The right to speedy trial is emphasized as a constitutional value impacting sentencing discretion.
  • The judgment can be cited where excessive trial duration is a significant factor in sentence modification.

Summary of Legal Reasoning

  • The Court accepted the appellant’s limited prayer for reduction of sentence based on the time already spent in custody and the prolonged 16-year trial period.
  • Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the judge observed the power of sentencing courts to exercise discretion in determining quantum of sentence, considering facts such as age of accused, nature and manner of offence, and time already undergone in detention.
  • Emphasis was placed on the right to speedy trial and mental, financial hardship undergone by the appellant as grounds for leniency.
  • The Court found no perversity in conviction but balanced the need for justice, deterrence, reformation, and proportionality in sentencing, modifying only the sentence by reducing it to the period served, and enhancing the fine.
  • The logic followed consistent with decisions in Deo Narain Mandal, Ravada Sasikala, Haripada Das, and Alister Anthony Pareira regarding proportional sentencing and delay in prosecution.

Arguments by the Parties

Petitioner:

  • Did not challenge the conviction on merits; sought only a reduction in quantum of sentence to period already undergone, citing that he has already served over 3 years.
  • Pointed to his young age (about 21 years at the time of conviction) and long duration of the trial.

State:

  • Opposed the prayer for reduction of sentence, supporting the trial court’s well-reasoned decision based on the evidence.
  • Cited involvement in another case (from which petitioner was acquitted).

Factual Background

The appellant was apprehended in March 2008, along with others, for planning a dacoity near an industrial area, and arrested with weapons and firearms. FIR No. 138/2008 was registered under Sections 399/402 of IPC and Sections 25/54/59 of the Arms Act. Following conviction, the appellant was sentenced to seven years’ RI, but had already served over 3 years by the time the appeal was decided, after a trial lasting more than 16 years. The challenge in this appeal was restricted to reduction of sentence only.

Statutory Analysis

  • The Court interpreted Sections 399 and 402 of the IPC (preparation/assembly for dacoity) and Section 25 of the Arms Act (possession of illegal firearms).
  • Referred to statutory provisions prescribing minimum and maximum sentences and reaffirmed that discretion in sentencing exists within statutory limits.
  • Emphasized the right to speedy trial as a fundamental right under the Constitution, in the context of sentencing.
  • No “reading down” or expansive interpretation of provisions; application was contextual to sentencing discretion.

Alert Indicators

  • ✔ Precedent Followed – The judgment affirms long-settled legal principles regarding sentencing discretion and follows established Supreme Court precedents.

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