Does Mere Mention of a Pathway as a Boundary in a Sale Deed Confer Easementary Right by Grant? — Madras High Court Affirms Existing Precedent

The Madras High Court clarifies that the mere reference to a pathway (battai) as a boundary in a sale deed does not itself confer an easementary right of way by express or implied grant, especially where the property in question is not a public road or shown to be set apart as a common way. This judgment upholds established law and distinguishes earlier precedent; it serves as binding authority for subordinate courts in similar disputes involving alleged implied grants of easement.

Summary

Practical Impact

What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note

• Clarifies that mentioning a pathway as a boundary in a sale deed does not by itself confer an easementary right of way, especially where the alleged pathway is not public or set apart as a common way.
• The burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the pathway was the only available means of access (“easement of necessity”) or that it was expressly or impliedly granted.
• Elevation or physical disconnection between the plaintiff’s land and the asserted pathway can be relevant in denying the claim for right of way.
• Previous precedents (like AIR 1924 MAD 834) do not automatically apply unless the factual context is identical.
• Lawyers should take care to establish clear evidence of usage, necessity, or express grant when pleading implied easements.

Summary of Legal Reasoning

• The Court considered whether the mention of a “common battai” (pathway) as a boundary in the sale deed created any grant of easementary right in favour of the grantee.
• Relying on and closely examining AIR 1924 MAD 834, the Court noted that precedent applies only when the property in question is specifically set apart or recognized as a street or public way.
• The judgment emphasized that, absent express words of grant or evidence of necessity, no implied right arises merely due to boundary description.
• The Court relied on Section 28 of the Easements Act, noting that any easement of necessity must be co-extensive with the actual necessity at the time of severance.
• On facts, it was found that the plaintiff did not prove exclusive necessity (others reached their lands by ridges), nor that the pathway in dispute was dedicated for public or third party use.
• The Court considered physical characteristics (including a 4-foot elevation difference) as making the pathway unsuitable as a matter of necessity or implied right.
• The claim for prescriptive or implied easement therefore failed, the lower courts’ findings were upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.

Arguments by the Parties

Petitioner (Appellant/Second Plaintiff):

• Asserted that describing the boundary as a pathway in the sale deed sufficed to confer a right of way.
• Claimed common battai was the only means of access due to necessity.
• Contended lower courts’ findings contradict precedent, specifically AIR 1924 MAD 834, AIR 1972 MAD 307, and 1997 III CTCT 461.

Respondent (Defendant/First Respondent):

• Asserted ‘B’ schedule property is private, not common or public.
• Emphasized plaintiff never granted right of way; family alone used the battai.
• Pointed to revenue records and physical site evidence (including elevation and prior sales of battai portions) showing no exclusive or necessary right for plaintiff.
• Asserted the appellant used her own ridges for access, negating necessity.

Factual Background

The first plaintiff purchased ‘A’ schedule property by registered sale deed dated 09.06.1964, with ‘B’ schedule property (alleged common battai) mentioned as a boundary. The suit was filed seeking declaration and injunction over right of way across ‘B’. Defendants claimed exclusive ownership of ‘B’, denied it was a common way, and contended the plaintiff had alternative access. The trial court and first appellate court rejected the plaintiff’s claim over ‘B’, finding no right of way established; this judgment was challenged by the second plaintiff (appellant) in Second Appeal.

Statutory Analysis

• Section 28, Easements Act: The court reiterated that an easement of necessity is determined by the necessity existing at the time the easement is claimed; the mere mention of a pathway as a boundary, without more, is insufficient to create an easement.
• The sale deed did not contain express terms granting a right of way; nor was the property public or a common way within the meaning of the law.

Dissenting / Concurring Opinion Summary

No dissenting or concurring opinions are recorded in this single-judge decision.

Procedural Innovations

No procedural innovations or new procedural precedents are set by this judgment.

Alert Indicators

• ✔ Precedent Followed – Judgment affirms existing legal principles and distinguishes, rather than overrules, relevant precedent.