Can the Nature of Offence Alone Be the Sole Ground to Deny Parole to Convicts Under the POCSO Act? High Court Clarifies Principles and Reaffirms Humanistic Approach

The Himachal Pradesh High Court, reaffirming the Supreme Court’s position, holds that the mere fact of conviction for a serious offence—by itself—cannot automatically justify denial of parole; decision must instead consider reformation prospects, conduct, and objective risk factors. This judgment upholds prevailing law, provides binding authority within Himachal Pradesh, and is highly relevant for criminal law practitioners, especially in cases involving parole applications by convicts under special statutes like POCSO.

 

Summary

Category Data
Case Name CWP/15640/2025 of PREM SINGH @ PREMTU Vs THE STATE OF HP AND OTHERS
CNR HPHC010607672025
Date of Registration 25-09-2025
Decision Date 17-10-2025
Disposal Nature Disposed Off
Judgment Author HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH
Court High Court of Himachal Pradesh
Bench Single Judge
Precedent Value Binding within the State of Himachal Pradesh
Overrules / Affirms Affirms and applies Supreme Court precedent (Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan)
Type of Law Criminal law / parole jurisprudence under POCSO, HP Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1968
Questions of Law Whether parole can be denied solely due to seriousness of the offence under POCSO, without considering conduct, reformation, or other objective factors.
Ratio Decidendi The Court held that denial of parole cannot rest solely on the serious nature of the offence. Even convicts under special statutes like POCSO are entitled to consideration of their personal circumstances, prospects of reformation, and actual threat assessment. Authorities must provide objective reasons and cannot base rejection purely on victim/family opposition absent demonstrable risk; parole serves not just the convict’s rights but also societal interests in reformation. The Court followed Supreme Court jurisprudence emphasising a humanistic, case-by-case analysis and quashed the rejection order, directing the grant of parole with stringent conditions to balance reformation and public safety.
Judgments Relied Upon
  • Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (2017) 15 SCC 55
  • Sunil Batra (II) v. State (UT of Delhi), (1980) 3 SCC 488
  • Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248
  • Charles Sobraj v. Superintendent Central Jail, Tihar, (1978) 4 SCC 104
Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon by the Court The judgment reiterates the Supreme Court’s view that parole promotes reformation and social reintegration, and should not be refused merely because the underlying offence was grave—unless there is evidence of the convict being a hardened criminal or posing a real risk. Assessment should include conduct in prison, objective threat, and personal/family/social needs.
Facts as Summarised by the Court The petitioner, convicted under Section 6 POCSO Act and serving a 20-year sentence, had completed over six years in prison and applied for parole to meet his family. The District Magistrate rejected the parole based on objection from the victim’s father citing threat. Gram Panchayat had no objection. Court found that the blanket reliance on the victim’s family’s apprehension, without objective assessment, was insufficient to justify denial.

Practical Impact

Category Impact
Binding On All subordinate courts in Himachal Pradesh; parole authorities in the State
Persuasive For Other High Courts and the Supreme Court (as application of Supreme Court precedent)
Follows
  • Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (2017) 15 SCC 55
  • Sunil Batra (II) v. State (UT of Delhi), (1980) 3 SCC 488
  • Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248
  • Charles Sobraj v. Superintendent Central Jail, Tihar, (1978) 4 SCC 104

What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note

  • Clarifies that parole cannot be denied solely due to the serious nature of the offence, including those under POCSO.
  • Authorities must consider prospects for reform, conduct, and actual threat, with parole rejection requiring objective, case-specific reasons.
  • Decision underscores that personal or family objections—unless substantiated by demonstrable risk—are insufficient for denial of parole.
  • Follows Supreme Court precedent that a humanistic, reformative approach applies even for “serious” offences, ensuring principles of dignity and reformation are protected.
  • Lawyers can cite this judgment in future parole petitions where the rejection is based only on the gravity of offence or general apprehensions, not specific evidence of risk or bad conduct.
  • Authorities are permitted and encouraged to impose strict and reasonable conditions if parole is granted, tailored to the case.

Summary of Legal Reasoning

  • The Court reviewed the factual record, finding that the only ground for rejection was the District Magistrate’s reliance on the victim’s father’s objection, unaccompanied by any objective threat assessment.
  • Drawing extensively from the Supreme Court judgment in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan, the Court reiterated that while seriousness of offence invites stricter scrutiny, it cannot by itself justify total refusal of parole.
  • The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, as cited and extracted in the present judgment, holds that reformation and social reintegration are essential components of sentencing; parole facilitates these aims by allowing convicts to maintain family and social ties.
  • The Court acknowledged public interest in ensuring security and possible risks but concluded that such concerns must be substantiated by evidence, not presumed from the conviction alone.
  • References were made to prior Supreme Court cases (Sunil Batra II, Maneka Gandhi, Charles Sobraj) affirming prisoners’ residual fundamental rights and the State’s duty to treat convicts humanely, albeit subject to reasonable restrictions.
  • The Court ordered that with stringent conditions (bond, sureties, undertaking not to contact victim/family), parole could be safely granted without exposing society or the family to undue risk.
  • The order also empowered authorities to impose any further conditions deemed necessary and clarified that breaches could be considered negatively in future applications.

Arguments by the Parties

Petitioner

  • Sought quashing of the rejection order and release on parole for 28 days.
  • Cited over six years of completed sentence and good conduct.
  • Asserted the rejection was based only on the victim’s father’s objection, with no substantive reasons provided.
  • Relied on Gram Panchayat’s no objection.

Respondents

  • Did not dispute conviction or sentence or that petitioner had applied for parole.
  • Contended that parole was rejected since the District Magistrate relayed the victim’s father’s objection citing apprehension of threat.
  • Prayed for dismissal of the writ on this basis and controverted other allegations.

Factual Background

The petitioner was convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court (Rape/POCSO) in Kinnaur, Himachal Pradesh, under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and sentenced to twenty years’ rigorous imprisonment. After serving over six years, he applied for 28 days’ parole in November 2023 to meet his family. The District Magistrate, following objection from the victim’s father citing threat, rejected the request without detailed assessment. The Gram Panchayat, however, raised no objection. The petitioner challenged the order, seeking parole on personal and humanitarian grounds, relying on his conduct and medical needs.

Statutory Analysis

  • The Court examined provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1968, concerning eligibility, grounds, and procedure for granting parole.
  • Article 226 of the Constitution of India was invoked for judicial review of administrative refusal to grant parole.
  • The statutory and constitutional framework, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, was applied to ensure parole is not arbitrarily refused solely for the nature of the offence without considering relevant factors like conduct, risk, and reformation.
  • No “reading down” was employed, but an affirmative reiteration of liberal construction in harmony with human dignity and reformation.

Procedural Innovations

  • The Court explicitly permitted the imposition of any further reasonable or just conditions as deemed necessary by prison authorities in addition to those specified in the order, to meet the ends of justice and public safety.

Alert Indicators

  • ✔ Precedent Followed – When existing law is affirmed.

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