The Chhattisgarh High Court sets aside convictions under IPC Sections 302/149, 147, and 201, firmly reasserting that conviction cannot rest solely on unreliable sole eyewitness testimony or weak/unsubstantiated dying declarations. The judgment follows and applies binding Supreme Court precedent, provides sector-wide guidance for criminal law practitioners, and is binding within the State of Chhattisgarh.
Summary
| Category | Data |
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| Case Name | CRA/1161/2014 of Vishwajeet Rai Vs State Of Chhattisgarh | CNR CGHC010012972014 |
| Date of Registration | 21-11-2014 |
| Decision Date | 16-10-2025 |
| Disposal Nature | ALLOWED |
| Judgment Author | Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad |
| Concurring or Dissenting Judges | Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey (concurring) |
| Court | High Court of Chhattisgarh |
| Bench | Division Bench: Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad |
| Precedent Value | Binding on subordinate courts in Chhattisgarh; persuasive value elsewhere |
| Overrules / Affirms | Affirms Supreme Court’s approach on eyewitness credibility and dying declarations |
| Type of Law | Criminal Law; Evidence; Criminal Procedure |
| Questions of Law |
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| Ratio Decidendi |
The Court has held that conviction in cases of murder and allied offences cannot be based merely on the unreliable testimony of a sole eyewitness or on dying declarations (oral or recorded under Section 161 CrPC) that lack corroboration and are surrounded by suspicious circumstances. Comprehensive scrutiny is required to establish the credibility of the eyewitness, their conduct, and consistency with medical and corroborative evidence. Statements under Section 161 CrPC do not automatically qualify as dying declarations unless made in anticipation of death and in compliance with legal standards. Where significant doubts, contradictions, and omissions exist in prosecution evidence, and independent corroboration is lacking, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused. The trial court’s conviction was overturned as prosecution failed to meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, following the law laid down by the Supreme Court. |
| Judgments Relied Upon |
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| Logic / Jurisprudence / Authorities Relied Upon by the Court |
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| Facts as Summarised by the Court |
The prosecution alleged that the appellants, forming an unlawful assembly, assaulted Avinash Pandey leading to his death, and later attempted to conceal the offence as a road accident. The sole eyewitness was Mukesh Sharma (PW-1), with allegations supported by oral and written statements obtained after significant delay. Medical evidence recorded initial cause as accident and showed consumption of alcohol by the deceased. FIR was belatedly registered after the deceased’s death, and neither the eyewitness nor relatives of the deceased reported the assault promptly. Police and medical records failed to corroborate assault. Both trial and postmortem findings were inconsistent with the prosecution story, leading the appellate court to hold the evidence insufficient for sustaining conviction. |
Practical Impact
| Category | Impact |
|---|---|
| Binding On | All subordinate courts in Chhattisgarh |
| Persuasive For |
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What’s New / What Lawyers Should Note
- The Court strongly reiterates that conviction cannot rest upon the solitary testimony of an unreliable or improbable sole eyewitness, especially when conduct is unnatural, delayed, or uncorroborated.
- Dying declarations recorded under Section 161 CrPC are not substantive evidence unless they meet the strict requirements of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act—being made in contemplation of death and properly recorded.
- Oral dying declarations are categorized as weak evidence and must be corroborated by other reliable material before forming the basis of conviction.
- When medical or contemporaneous documentary evidence (such as MLC/postmortem) is inconsistent with prosecution allegations, acquittal is warranted.
- Cases with delayed reporting, omissions by purported eyewitnesses, or lack of prompt police action must be examined with heightened scrutiny.
Summary of Legal Reasoning
- Scrutiny of Sole Witness: The Court extensively analyzed the conduct and statements of PW-1 (Mukesh Sharma), finding his testimony rife with omissions, delays, inconsistent conduct, unexplained possession of the deceased’s phone, and animosity towards one accused—all undermining his credibility per Ganesh Bhavan Patel and Narendrasinh Keshubhai Zala.
- Delayed and Uncorroborated Reporting: Both the sole eyewitness and the deceased’s relatives failed to report the alleged assault promptly, despite opportunities and presence at key investigative events—a fact the Court held as highly suspicious and fatal to the prosecution.
- Medical and Circumstantial Contradictions: The MLC (Ex.P-5) and postmortem (Ex.P-7), as well as testimony from two independent doctors, supported the defense version of accidental injury rather than homicidal assault and did not corroborate prosecution’s theory.
- Dying Declaration Evidence: The Court explained that statements under Section 161 CrPC, as in this case, are not substantive evidence and cannot serve as dying declarations unless all legal requirements are met. Oral dying declarations made to family or friends are inherently weak, require corroboration, and in this case were surrounded by suspicious circumstances per Darshana Devi and Arun Bhanudas Pawar.
- Duty to Register and Investigate FIR: The police failed to register FIR or take action despite an alleged statement by the deceased, raising further doubts about prosecution’s credibility.
- Application of Supreme Court Precedents: The Court followed Supreme Court guidance (Ganesh Bhavan Patel, Shahid Khan, Narendrasinh Keshubhai Zala, and others) in holding that quality, not quantity, of evidence is determinative, and that suspicion is no substitute for proof.
- Benefit of Doubt: Where serious doubts exist and independent corroboration is absent, the benefit of doubt must always go to the accused.
Arguments by the Parties
Petitioner
- The incident was in fact a road accident, not a murder.
- The prosecution had no cogent, credible, or clinching evidence against the appellants.
- Delay in lodging FIR and reporting incident cast serious doubt on prosecution’s story.
- Sole eyewitness (PW-1) was unreliable: delayed statement, omissions, unexplained possession of deceased’s phone, and personal animosity.
- Dying declaration (Section 161 statement) was not properly recorded and cannot be relied upon as a dying declaration.
- Cited Ganesh Bhavan Patel v. State of Maharashtra (1978) 4 SCC 371 and Narendrasinh Keshubhai Zala v. State of Gujarat (2023) 18 SCC 783.
Respondent
- The prosecution has established guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt.
- Prosecution evidence, including witness testimony and medical records, are sufficient.
- Sought affirmation of trial court’s conviction and sentence.
Factual Background
The prosecution alleged that the appellants, forming an unlawful assembly, intercepted and assaulted Avinash Pandey with sticks near the FCI Godown, Bagbahara, on the night of 11.06.2013, causing his death. Initially, the incident was reported as a road accident, and the injured was transported to hospital, where medical examination was conducted. The FIR was registered only on 16.06.2013 after the death of Avinash Pandey, although family members and an alleged eyewitness were aware of the alleged assault prior to the registration. Medical and police records at all material times noted the injuries as accident-related. Prosecution’s case revolved around belated oral and written statements implicating the accused.
Statutory Analysis
- Interpreted Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act: Dying declarations must be made in contemplation of death, recorded per legal standards, and corroborated before serving as basis of conviction.
- Section 161 CrPC: Statements recorded by police are not substantive evidence, and cannot per se be used as dying declarations unless all legal requirements are met.
- Section 27 Evidence Act: Only that portion of a confession leading directly to a discovery is admissible.
- Court discussed the legal propositions around oral dying declarations, applying Supreme Court dicta that such evidence is inherently weak and requires corroboration.
- The principle of benefit of doubt and presumption of innocence in criminal jurisprudence reaffirmed.
Dissenting / Concurring Opinion Summary
Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey concurred with the reasoning and judgment of Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad. No dissenting opinion.
Procedural Innovations
- Required appellants to furnish a personal bond in terms of Section 437-A CrPC, ensuring their presence in case of future Supreme Court proceedings.
- Directed immediate transmission of trial court records for compliance as per procedure.
Alert Indicators
- Precedent Followed – The judgment meticulously applies existing Supreme Court law on evidentiary requirements, dying declarations, and eyewitness reliability, reaffirming rather than overturning precedent.